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“We are in the business of rigging elections.” 
North Carolina state senator2 
 
“We are going to shove [the district map] up your fu*king ass and you are going to like it, and I’ll 
fu*ck any Republican I can.”    
Democratic chairman regarding the new districting plan for 
Democratic-led county board in Illinois3  
 
“[W]e are going to draw the lines so that Republicans will be in oblivion in the state of New York 
for the next 20 years.”   
Malcolm Smith, New York State Senate president4 
 
“It is fair to infer that partisan considerations may have played a significant role in the decision to 
enact” Indiana’s voter identification law. 
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 128 S.Ct. 1610, 1624 
(2008) (Stevens, J., plural. op).   
 
“Too often, Members’ first thought is not what is right or what they believe, but how it will affect 
fundraising.  Who, after all, can seriously contend that a $100,000 donation does not alter the way 
one thinks about – and quite possibly votes on – an issue?  . . .” 
Alan Simpson, former United States Senator5 
 
“Even a cursory survey of world events over the last 20 – or 100 – years makes plain that 




I.     INTRODUCTION 
Representative democracy does not spontaneously occur by citizens 
gathering to choose laws.  Instead, republicanism takes place within an 
extensive legal framework that determines who gets to vote, how campaigns 
are conducted, what conditions must be met for representatives to make 
valid law, and many other things.  Many of these “rules-of-the-road” that 
operationalize representative democracy have been subject to constitutional 
challenges in recent decades.  For example, lawsuits have been brought 
against “partisan gerrymandering,” which has contributed to most 
congressional districts not being party-competitive, but instead being safely 
                                                 
2 See Hoefel, Six Incumbents Are a Week Away from Easy Election, Winston-
Salem Journal, Jan. 27, 1998, p. B1, quoted in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 
(2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
3 JONATHAN WINBURN, THE REALITIES OF REDISTRICTING 1 (Lexington 
Books 2008). 
4 “He Probably Didn’t Mean To,” THE NEW YORK TIMES, page A28, May 6, 2010. 
5 McConnell et al. v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 149 (2003). 
6 “The Strange Career of Voter Suppression,” THE NEW YORK TIMES, page A19, 
February 13, 2012. 
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Republican or Democratic,7 and against onerous voter identification 
requirements that reduce the voting rates of certain voting populations.8   
 These constitutional challenges were based on individual rights claims 
that were grounded in Equal Protection or Free Speech.  This Article’s 
principle argument is that the rules-of-the-road of representative democracy 
also implicate a structural constitutional principle, wholly independent of 
individual rights based claims, that to date has gone unnoticed:   “Republican 
Legitimacy.”9 The Article explains Republican Legitimacy’s source and 
content, the costs of failing to recognize it, and the payoffs of doing so.   
Republican Legitimacy’s derivation is relatively straightforward.  The 
Constitution establishes a federal government that essentially is a 
representative democracy, i.e., a republican form of government.  The 
Constitution also guarantees a republican form of government to the states.  
The Constitution’s establishment and guarantee of republicanism across the 
federal and state governments encompass the necessary preconditions for 
these republican forms of government to successfully and legitimately 
operate.   These preconditions are the contents of the constitutional principle 
of Republican Legitimacy.     
Republican Legitimacy’s absence has led to egregious conduct by  
legislatures and distorted judicial analyses. As to legislatures, look again at the 
shocking statements collected in the prologue:10  legislators acknowledging 
that they “are in the business of rigging elections,”11 that “we are going to 
draw the lines so that Republicans will be in oblivion in the state of New 
York for the next 20 years,”12  and that campaign “donations . . . alter the 
way one thinks about – and quite possibly votes on – an issue  . . .”13  The 
harm is not just to individuals, but to republican government itself.    
                                                 
7 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); see Sam Hirsch, The United States 
House of Unrepresentatives:  What Went Wrong in the Latest Round of Congressional 
Redistricting, 3 ELECTION L. J. 179 (2003) (providing exhaustive analysis of 
gerrymandering of congressional districts); Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes 
Guarding Henhouses:  The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 663-64 (2002) (noting that most congressional districts are 
safely democratic or republican); but See Rhodes Cook, Congressional Redistricting:  Is 
Creating “Safe” Districts a Dying Art?, 
http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/frc2011033101 (March 31, 
2011) (concluding that “safe congressional seats will always be with us, but probably 
not as many as their most ambitious creators would want”). 
8 Crawford v. Merion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
9 The closest anyone else has come is Professor Teachout, who has proposed 
that the Constitution contains an “anti-corruption” principle. See Zephyr Teachout, 
The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341 (2009).  Part II.C.3 explains why 
Republican Legitimacy is doctrinally and conceptually superior to “anti-corruption.” 
10 See supra text and notes 2 - 8. 
11 See supra note 2. 
12 See supra note 4. 
13 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 149 (quoting former U.S. Senator Alan Simpson). 
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More generally, inattentiveness to Republican Legitimacy has led 
legislators to think that democracy’s rules-of-the-road are a part of ordinary 
politics.  Republican Legitimacy makes clear that politicians have a special 
duty to act with a higher order of care when choosing the rules-of-the-road:  
they must act in accordance with “tempered” rather than “hardball” politics.  
As skeptical as one may be of politicians, there is no reason to assume 
legislators would not take seriously their oaths to uphold the Constitution 
once they understood it included Republican Legitimacy.  Furthermore, there 
are steps that courts and Congress can take to encourage state legislatures --  
the institutions presumptively responsible for most of the rules-of-the-road 
under the Constitution14 – to act consistently with “tempered politics.” 
As to courts, the individual rights doctrines they have invoked have 
left vulnerable the structural interests of Republican Legitimacy. Republican 
Legitimacy identifies legally significant facts that are overlooked by rights 
doctrines that focus primarily on individuals, provides conceptual traction 
that rights-based doctrines do not, and makes clear why various sub-
doctrines developed in the individual-rights context that limit judicial review 
have no rightful application in respect of a structural principle like 
Republican Legitimacy.   
This Article’s argument unfolds in five parts.  Part II explains the 
doctrinal source of Republican Legitimacy, as well as its contents.  Like the 
constitutional principles of separation of powers and federalism, Republican 
Legitimacy is a structural principle that protects and effectuates the 
republican institutions that are created and guaranteed by the Constitution.  
Republican Legitimacy secures the conditions that must pertain for decisions 
of the people’s representatives to legitimately bind the people.  Drawing 
primarily on political theory, Part II explains that Republican Legitimacy has 
two components:  (1) the mechanisms for determining who will be the 
representatives in a republican form of government and (2) the decision-
making processes that the representatives use in generating the laws that are 
to bind the polity.  Part II then anticipates several possible objections, and 
explains why Republican Legitimacy is conceptually and doctrinally superior 
to the “anti-corruption” principle that is found in some case law and has 
been discussed by some scholars.15     
Part III then considers to what extent Republican Legitimacy is 
already present in the Court’s jurisprudence.  It first shows that many 
Supreme Court decisions have recognized the significance of the two 
components of Republican Legitimacy.  Most of these decisions, however, 
have folded these considerations into the individual-rights doctrines of equal 
protection and free speech.  Part III explains why it is critical that Republican 
Legitimacy be recognized as a structural constitutional principle that is 
independent of the individual rights-based doctrines of equal protection and 
free speech.  
                                                 
14 See U.S. CONST. ART. I, §4, cl. 1. 
15 See supra note 9. 
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Part IV demonstrates Republican Legitimacy’s explanatory power by 
applying it to three recent Supreme Court decisions.  Republican Legitimacy 
illuminates  troublesome features of Indiana’s strict voter identification law 
that were not treated as legally significant under Justice Stevens’ plurality 
opinion in Crawford v. v. Merion County Election Board,16 and explains why a 
successful challenge would  not require a showing of discriminatory intent, 
pace Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion.  Part IV then uses Republican 
Legitimacy to critique the Vieth v. Jubelirer17 decision, which essentially 
declared political gerrymandering to be non-justiciable.18 Republican 
Legitimacy identifies heretofore unrecognized common ground shared by 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and the four Vieth dissenters that conceivably 
could have led to a different result in the case.   
Part IV then applies Republican Legitimacy to the Court’s divisive 
decision of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,19 which invoked the 
First Amendment to strike down the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s 
prohibition against the use of corporate and union general treasury funds for 
independent expenditures.20  Republican Legitimacy clarifies the nature and 
significance of the governmental interest behind the Act’s expenditures 
prohibition.  Republican Legitimacy provides a more elegant and compelling 
frame for understanding the welter of policies discussed in Justice Stevens’ 
dissent under the rubrics of “anti-corruption” and “anti-distortion,” and 
Republican Legitimacy’s constitutional status explain why these policies 
satisfy the compelling governmental interest requirement.  Independent of 
this, Part IV also shows that deciding whether corporate and union 
expenditures should be banned implicated a conflict between competing 
constitutional principles -- free speech and Republican Legitimacy – and 
argues that Congress’ considered resolution of such a constitutional conflict 
should have been entitled to substantial deference by the Court.  
Part V provides a conclusion that also serves as a prologue to a 
companion article that considers what roles different governmental and 
societal institutions must play if Republican legitimacy is to be appropriately 
guarded.21  Courts have a vital role to play, as this Article shows, but so do 
the legislatures themselves.   
II.   TEXTUAL AND CONCEPTUAL DERIVATION OF REPUBLICAN LEGITIMACY 
This Part II explains the derivation and contents of Republican 
Legitimacy.  It proceeds in three steps.  Part II.A. explains from where in the 
                                                 
16 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
17 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
18 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which provided the crucial fifth vote, left only 
a small window open for political gerrymandering claims.  See infra Part IV.B. 
19 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
20 See id. at 887. 
21 See Mark D. Rosen, Implementing Republican Legitimacy:  Courts and Tempered 
Politics (manuscript). 
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Constitution Republican Legitimacy is derived.   Part II.B explains 
Republican Legitimacy’s contents.  Part II.C anticipates and responds to 
three arguments that may be leveled against the claim that Republican 
Legitimacy is an independent structural constitutional principle.  
A.     Republican Legitimacy’s Doctrinal Derivation  
Republican Legitimacy is a structural constitutional principle that 
derives from five constitutional provisions that together establish that the 
federal and state governments are essentially republican in character insofar 
as governmental power is exercised by representatives who ultimately are 
answerable to citizens.22 The first provision is Article I’s charge that the 
House of Representatives “shall be composed of Members chosen . . . by the 
People.”23  The second is the Seventeenth Amendment’s instruction that the 
Senate be composed of Senators “elected by the people . . .”24  The third are 
the constitutional provisions, as supplemented by custom, that establish that 
the president is essentially popularly elected.25  Fourth,  the republican 
character of all these popularly elected institutions is confirmed, and has been 
deepened, by the Amendments that have expanded the franchise, namely the 
Fifteenth (race, color, or previous condition of servitude), Nineteenth 
(women), Twenty-fourth (proscribing poll taxes), and Twenty-Sixth 
Amendments (age).   Fifth, and finally, the Guarantee Clause provides that 
“[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican 
Form of Government . . .”26  
                                                 
22To be sure, many different concepts of “republican” can be located among 
Americans during the Founding era.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 276-81 (demonstrating that many in the Framer’s 
generation treated democracy and republican interchangeably); GORDON S. WOOD, 
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 48-90, 593-618 
(describing the evolution of the meaning of “republicanism” between the 
Revolution and 1787).  I draw upon Madison’s understanding of republicanism in 
Federalist 10, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 81-84 (J. Madison) (Rossiter ed), 
which has become the accepted definition today, see AMAR, supra at 276.  
23 U.S. Const. Art. I, §2, cl. 2. 
24 U.S. Const., Amend. 17. 
25Although Article II only provides that the President shall be elected by 
“Electors” appointed by the state legislatures, it long has been understood that the 
federal government is a “government whose essential character is republican, whose 
executive head and legislative body are both elective . . .”  Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 
U.S. 651, 657 (1884). The Twenty-third Amendment strengthens the President’s 
republican character by guaranteeing that the people residing in the District of 
Columbia can participate in his election. 
26 U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 4.  My claim that the Guarantee Clause is the source of a 
constitutional principle binding states and the federal government is unaffected by 
the Clause’s having been held to be a nonjusticiable political question, See Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218-20 (1962), because non-justiciable constitutional questions 
are still binding, even if they are not judicially enforceable. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 
292.  Further, the Court has held that the Guarantee Clause is enforceable by 
Congress, see Baker, 369 U.S. at 220, and my proposal places primary responsible 
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Republican Legitimacy’s derivation from the above provisions is 
straightforward:  The Constitution’s establishment and guarantee of 
republican forms of government include the minimum powers and 
limitations that are necessary to protect and effectuate these republican 
institutions. These powers and limitations are themselves of constitutional 
dimension, and they constitute the structural constitutional principle of 
Republican Legitimacy.27   
The Supreme Court has recognized other non-explicit, structural 
constitutional principles on the ground that they are necessary to preserve or 
effectuate institutions created by, or recognized by, the Constitution. Most of 
these structural principles function as limitations on expressly granted 
constitutional powers, but some principles have been the source of 
affirmative governmental powers.   
The two best known structural principles that operate as 
constitutional limitations are separation-of-powers and federalism.  In 
Morrison v. Olson,28 for example, the Court held that Congress can restrict the 
President’s power to remove executive officials only insofar as it “does not 
interfere with the President’s exercise of the ‘executive power’ and his 
constitutionally appointed duty to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed.”29  What was necessary to preserve the President’s explicitly created 
constitutional powers thus constituted an implied constitutional limitation on 
Congress’ powers.  Similarly, the Court in New York v. U.S.30 held that 
Congress could not “commandeer” state legislatures, notwithstanding the 
absence of an express constitutional provision barring Congress from doing 
so, because such an anti-commandeering rule was necessary to “protect the 
sovereignty of states.”31  Republican Legitimacy is similarly derived:  it is a 
constitutional principle that consists of what is necessary to preserve the 
representative democracy that our Constitution creates (vis-à-vis the federal 
government) and guarantees (vis-à-vis the states).  
Separation of powers and federalism are not the only examples of 
                                                                                                                         
for enforcing Republican Legitimacy with Congress.  See Rosen, Implementing 
Republican Legitimacy, supra note 21.    
27 Jack Balkin has similarly spoken of “democratic self governance” as a 
structural principle.  See Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2010). 
28 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
29 Id. at 689-90;  see also id. at 690 (holding that the Ethics in Government Act 
“taken as a whole” does not “violate[] the principle of separation of powers by 
unduly interfering with the role of the Executive Branch.”). 
30 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
31 Id. at 181; see also id. at 177 (in “determining whether the Tenth Amendment 
limits the ability of Congress to subject state governments to generally applicable 
laws, the Court has in some cases stated that it will evaluate the strength of federal 
interests in light of the degree to which such laws would prevent the State from 
functioning as a sovereign; that is, the extent to which such generally applicable laws 
would impede a state government's responsibility to represent and be accountable to 
the citizens of the State.”). 
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implied constitutional limitations that protect constitutionally created 
institutions.  Consider the case of U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,32 where 
the Court held unconstitutional an Arkansas law establishing term limits for 
congressmen from that state.  No provision of the Constitution explicitly 
forbade states from imposing term limits.  The Court nonetheless found an 
implied constitutional limitation, justifying it inter alia on the ground that it  
was necessary to protect the constitutionally-created institution of the House 
of Representatives:  “The Constitution thus creates a uniform national body 
representing the interests of a single people.  Permitting individual States to 
formulate diverse qualifications for their representatives would result in a 
patchwork of state qualifications, undermining the uniformity and the 
national character that the Framers envisioned and sought to ensure.”33  
The Court also has found implied constitutional powers on the ground 
that they were necessary to effectuate constitutionally-created institutions.  
Consider first the constitutional executive privilege.  The Court held in United 
States v. Nixon that although  “[n]owhere in the Constitution . . . is there any 
explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this 
interest relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers, it is 
constitutionally based.”34 The Court’s conclusion that the executive privilege 
is a constitutional power rested on pragmatic reasoning.  “The privilege is 
fundamental to the operation of Government because [a] President and 
those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of 
shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be 
unwilling to express except privately.”35 There must be “candid, objective and 
even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking.”36  
The Court also has found that Congress has implied constitutional 
powers.  Although the Constitution does not expressly grant Congress the 
power to investigate, the Court held in McGrain v. Daugherty37 that Congress 
has constitutional investigative powers because such powers are a 
prerequisite to effective legislation. Congress “possesses not only such 
powers as are expressly granted to them by the Constitution, but such 
auxiliary powers as are necessary and appropriate to make the express powers 
effective.”38 In determining what “auxiliary” powers were necessary to “make 
the express powers effective,” the Court once again utilized pragmatic 
reasoning.  “A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the 
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is 
intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself 
possess the requisite information -- which not infrequently is true --  recourse 
must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere 
                                                 
32 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
33 Id. at 822. 
34 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974). 
35 Id. at 708.     
36 Id. 
37 273 U.S. 135 (1927). 
38 Id. at 173. 
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requests for such information often are unavailing, and also that information 
which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of 
compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed.”39       
In short, separation-of-powers and federalism jurisprudence, as well 
as the Thornton, Nixon, and McGrain decisions, all reasoned that powers and 
limitations that were necessary to protect or effectuate expressly-created or 
recognized constitutional institutions were themselves of constitutional 
status.  Republican Legitimacy is derivable on the same basis:  the 
Constitution expressly establishes a republican federal government and 
guarantees that the states similarly will have republican governments, and 
these constitutional institutions and guarantees include the minimum 
conditions that are necessary to protect and effectuate these republican 
forms of government.  
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
That the Court has found implied constitutional powers (and limits) 
in other contexts does not, on its own, mean that it should do so here.  The 
Article’s next parts explain why Republican Legitimacy is another appropriate 
constitutional inference.  Part II.B  draws on political theory to explain why 
there must be a principle such as Republican Legitimacy if republican 
institutions are to be well functioning and stable.  This analysis permits the 
construction of a framework that fleshes out Republican Legitimacy’s 
concrete contents. Parts III.A and III.B show that many of the components 
of Republican Legitimacy already have been recognized in case law.   
Parts II.B and III.A-III.B are mutually reinforcing.  Parts III.A-III.B 
provide a doctrinal basis for Part II.B’s theoretical discussion.  Further, Part 
III serves as inductive support for Part II.B’s theoretical reasoning.40   In the 
other direction, Part II.B’s analytical framework offers critical insights into 
the Court’s jurisprudence.  It makes clear that case law that until now has 
been thought to address disparate subjects (such as limitations on the 
franchise, term limits, and campaign finance) actually are part of a single 
whole:  they are aspects of the jurisprudence of Republican Legitimacy.  
Part II.B’s framework also identifies two shortcomings in the case 
law.  First, some matters that the Court has treated as “compelling interests” 
are actually part Republican Legitimacy, and hence are of independent 
                                                 
39 Id. at 175.  The Court also noted that congressional investigate powers had a 
long historical pedigree.  See id.  But the Court used the longstanding historical 
practice as confirmation of the legislature’s pragmatic need of such a power, not as a 
prerequisite to finding the constitutional power.  See id. (“All this was true before 
and when the Constitution was framed and adopted. In that period the power of 
inquiry, with enforcing process, was regarded and employed as a necessary and 
appropriate attribute of the power to legislate-indeed, was treated as inhering in it. 
Thus there is ample warrant for thinking, as we do, that the constitutional 
provisions which commit the legislative function to the two houses are intended to 
include this attribute to the end that the function may be effectively exercised.”)  
40 See infra note 210. 
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constitutional status.  Second, some matters that the Court has treated under 
the rubric of individual rights instead are aspects of the structural 
constitutional principle of Republican Legitimacy.  Part III.C explains why it 
is important that Republican Legitimacy be understood as an independent 
constitutional principle that is structural rather than rights-based.   
B.    Republican Legitimacy’s Content   
The contents of Republican Legitimacy are best identified by asking 
the following question:  what conditions must be met for decisions of the 
peoples’ representatives to legitimately bind the people?41 A governmental 
system that cannot provide an adequate answer to this question cannot be 
both free and stable.42  Jeremy Waldron sets up the issues nicely: 
We imagine a decision being made by a certain process and we 
imagine a citizen Cn– who is to be bound or burdened by the 
decision – disagreeing with the decision and asking why she should 
accept, comply, or put up with it.  Some of those who support the 
decision may try to persuade Cn that it is right in its substance.  But 
they may fail, not because of any obtuseness on her part, but 
simply because Cn continues (not unreasonably) to hold a different 
view on this vexed and serious matter.  What then is to be said to 
Cn?  A plausible answer may be offered to her concerning the 
process by which the decision was reached.  Even though she 
disagrees with the outcome, she may be able to accept that it was 
arrived at fairly.  The theory of such a process-based response is 
the theory of political legitimacy.43 
Waldron helpfully concludes that there are two components to a 
theory of political legitimacy.  First, there must be an appropriate mechanism 
for selecting which individuals will make the community’s political decisions 
(i.e., who will be the representatives in a republican form of government). I 
shall call this the “Legitimate-Selection” component.  Second, the 
representatives must themselves utilize an acceptable decision-procedure 
when creating laws.44  Call this component “Legitimate-Decisionmaking.”  In 
short, Legitimate-Selection addresses the integrity of electoral results, whereas 
Legitimate-Decisionmaking concerns legislative results.45   
                                                 
41 Cf. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 24 (defining a “reasonably just 
(though not necessarily a fully just) constitutional democratic government” as a 
“government [that] is effectively under th[e people’s] political and electoral control . 
. .”). 
42 See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 35 (describing the 
requirement of a “well-ordered society” in which “citizens have a normally effective 
sense of justice and so they generally comply with society’s basic institutions, which 
they regard as just”). 
43 See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L. J. 
1346, 1387 (2006). 
44 See id. 
45 Sanford Levinson uses a similar two-part framework.  See SANFORD 
LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 27.   
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1. Legitimate-Selection 
The constitutional principle of Republican Legitimacy comprises the 
minimum requirements of the two aforementioned components.  The 
Legitimate-Selection component encompasses what Waldron helpfully calls 
“the theory of fair elections to the legislature, elections in which people like 
Cn were treated equally along with all their fellow citizens in determining who 
should be privileged to be among the small number participating” in the law-
making that will bind Cn and all other citizens.46  Pace Waldron’s formulation, 
though, there is not a single “theory of fair elections,” but instead are multiple 
legitimate contenders. For example, strong arguments can be made on behalf 
of both majoritarian and proportional electoral systems.47  
Reasonably controversial aspects of fair elections are not part of the 
constitutional requirement of Republican Legitimacy (though they may well be 
included in Waldron’s first component of political democracy).  Instead, 
Republican Legitimacy comprises matters about which there can be no 
reasonable disagreement – matters that are veritable sine qua nons of a 
republican system, such as the requirement of competitive elections for 
important governmental officials.  For example,  a political system where 
citizens vote only for or against a single candidate for their country’s chief 
executive – as in the former Soviet Union and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – 
categorically fall outside the scope of a republican form of government.  
Encompassed within Legitimate-Selection are such matters as who has the 
franchise, how votes are cast (which in turn includes voter registration and 
the mechanics of voting), and how votes are aggregated (i.e., whether districts 
are used and, if so, how they are drawn).  I will have much more to say  
about Legitimate-Selection in Part IV.  
2.     Legitimate-Decisionmaking 
The contents of the second component of Republican Legitimacy  –
Legitimate-Decisionmaking – are difficult to specify.  For example, while 
majority rule might be thought to be part of the second component, there are 
strong reasons to resist this conclusion.48  Probably the most important 
                                                 
46 Id. at 1387. 
47 For a useful discussion, see CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM:  ISSUES AND 
ALTERNATIVES (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds. 1984).  
48 Waldron provides a brief but spirited defense of the principle of majority 
decision, see Waldron, supra note 43, at 1388, but his claim that majority 
decisionmaking is necessary to political legitimacy is doubtful.  Majority rule in fact 
is normatively controversial.  See  AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND 
SOCIAL WELFARE 161-63 (1970); VERMEULE, supra note 49, at 7; John O. McGinnis 
& Michael B. Rappaport, Majority and Supermajority Rules:  Three Views of the Capitol, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1115 (2007). Further, some aspects of the Constitution (such as the 
Treaty Clause) explicitly demand a supermajority, and it has been persuasively 
argued that our Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements 
effectively operate as a supermajority requirement.  See id. 
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aspect of Legitimate-Decisionmaking derives from the fact that virtually all 
theories of democracy incorporate a requirement that, when government 
acts, it act for the purpose of promoting the “public good, somehow 
defined” and, conversely, that “self-interested behavior by government 
officials” is illegitimate.49  
Indeed, “public good” requirements are a central component of the 
theories of many of the most important political theorists, past and present. 
A central concern of Western political theory has been to explain why the 
state can justifiably compel individuals against their will, and the limits of that 
power.50  “Public good” requirements have played a central role in answering 
these crucial questions.51  
According to John Locke, for example, the legislature has power to 
enact laws only because “the public has chosen and appointed” the 
legislature.52  This consent is the sine qua non of law’s legitimacy for Locke:  
what is “absolutely necessary to . . . a law” is that the law have emanated 
from a body that has “the consent of the society, over whom nobody can 
have a power to make laws, but by their own consent and by authority 
received from them.”53  Legislative power accordingly can extend only to the 
powers that the legislature has been granted by the people.  And this 
principle determines the outer limit of legislative power: because “nobody 
can transfer to another more power than he has in himself,” the legislature 
can have no more power than “those persons had in a state of nature before 
they entered into society and gave up to the community.”54  Locke 
understands man’s powers under the law of nature to extend only to “the 
                                                 
49 Cf. ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY:  INSTITUTIONAL 
DESIGN WRIT SMALL 4-5 (2007); see also id. at 34 (“Disagreement about the 
uniquely best definition of impartiality need not prove an embarrassment to the 
limited ambitions of real-world democratic design, which are fully satisfied by 
identifying a set of decisions that all competing definitions of impartiality 
condemn.”).  
50 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 42, at 217 and back cover (“[w]e ask:  when may 
citizens by their vote properly exercise their coercive political power over one 
another when fundamental questions are at stake?”); JOHN STUART MILL, ON 
LIBERTY 59 (the “subject of this essay is . . . the nature and limits of the power 
which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual,” which for Mill 
includes both state power and non-legal customs); GERALD GAUS, THE ORDER OF 
PUBLIC REASON:  A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND MORALITY IN A DIVERSE AND 
BOUNDED WORLD 2 (“The question that has occupied liberal political theory – 
whether free and equal persons can endorse a common political order even though 
their private judgments about the good and justice are so often opposed – is the 
fundamental problem of a free moral order”). 
51 Indeed, public good requirements can be traced back to Aristotle and Aquinas.  
See Eduardo M. Penalver & Lior Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process?, 
CORNELL L. REV. at n. 50 (forthcoming 2012).   
52 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, chapter XI, ¶134. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at ¶135. 
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preservation of himself and the rest of mankind,” and so Locke accordingly 
concludes that the legislature’s “power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to 
the public good of the society,”55 which he defines as the preservation of himself 
and mankind. Locke consistently contrasts pursuit of the “public good” with 
the illegitimate exercise of “power for [a ruler’s] private ends of their own”56 
and with a ruler’s “distinct and separate interest from the good of the 
community . . .”57      
Public good requirements are also central to Rousseau.  Rousseau 
thought the state’s legitimate powers extend only to “authentic act[s] of the 
general will,” meaning “the common good” or “the common interest.”58 For 
Rousseau, the “general will” consists only of those desires of an individual 
that are shared by all other citizens in his polity.59  For this reason, when the 
state identifies and enforces the general will, it does not compel a citizen 
against his will.  To the contrary, limiting state power to the general will 
assures that the citizen need “obey nobody but [his] own will.”60  It follows 
that when lawmakers legislate, they must aim to advance only the common 
good, and that they cannot act parochially “towards any particular and 
circumscribed object . . .”61  This is yet another “public good” requirement. 
While contemporary political theorists largely reject Lock’s 
assumption of actual consent62 and Rousseau’s assumption that laws 
constitute the overlap of citizens’  wills,63 most theorists continue to embrace 
“public good” requirements.64  John Rawls, for example, states that “[o]ur 
                                                 
55 Id. (emphasis supplied). Locke also argues that the executive’s “prerogative” 
power gives him the power to “act according to discretion for the public good, 
without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it . . .”  Id. at ¶160.  
But the executive’s prerogative power, like the legislature’s power, is limited to that 
which is for the “public good.”  Id.; see also id. at ¶163. 
56 Id. at ¶162.  
57 Id. at ¶163. 
58 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, Book 2, chapter 4, at 76-
7 (Maurice Cranston Trans.) 
59 See DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
FRAMEWORK 103 (explaining Rousseau’s ‘general will’ as being “whatever is 
common to the will of all citizens”). 
60 See id. at 77.  
61 Id. at 75. 
62 For example, though Rawls falls within the contractarian tradition, his 
approach does not rest on citizens’ actual consent, but instead aims to describe by 
means of the original position what political structure reasonable persons 
hypothetically would consent to.  See generally, C.A. Stark, Hypothetical Consent and 
Justification, 97 JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 313, 313 & n. 1 (2000).  For the unusual 
example of a modern theorist who retains the requirement of actual consent, see 
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION 
OF LIBERTY 11-31 (2004). 
63 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron. 
64 Notable exceptions are the public choice theorists, who posit that politics is a 
forum, no different from the marketplace, where people aim to advance their 
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exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the 
reasons we would offer for our political actions – were we to state them as 
government officials – are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that other 
citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons.”65  He dubs this the 
“criterion of reciprocity,” and concludes that such reciprocity is a 
requirement of “political legitimacy.”66  Furthermore (and in apparent 
contradistinction to the stricter notion of Rawlsian “public reason”), the 
criterion of reciprocity applies to “particular statutes and laws enacted.”67  
Self-interested “naked preferences”68 cannot satisfy the criterion of 
reciprocity, which accordingly operates as a “public good” requirement.    
A public good requirement also features in the powerful work of 
Brown University philosopher David Estlund.  Estlund aims to explain the 
legitimacy of democratic decisionmaking processes without relying on 
citizens’ consent (since most citizens have not given their actual consent to 
those processes or to the authority of the government).69  His answer is that 
it is not sufficient that the democratic procedure be “fair” – for if that were 
sufficient, then we should be willing to “flip a coin” to make political 
decisions insofar as coin-flipping is perfectly random and hence fair – 
something that no one is willing to do.70  Estlund concludes that beyond 
being fair, democratic procedures must have “some epistemic value,” that is 
to say they must have “a tendency to make correct decisions.”71   
                                                                                                                         
individual interests.  I discuss these theorists below. 
65 JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, WITH “THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON 
REVISITED” 137 (1999). 
66 See also id. at 149 (writing of “the idea of legitimacy and public reason’s role in 
determining legitimate law”).   
67 See id.  Public reason, by contrast, “applies” only to “fundamental political 
questions,” which Rawls tells us comprises “constitutional essentials and matters of 
basic justice.”  Id. at 133.  Somewhat confusingly, however, Rawls elsewhere states 
that public reason “has five different aspects,” one of which is the application of a 
“family of reasonable political conceptions of justice . . . in discussions of coercive 
norms to be enacted in the form of legitimate law for a democratic people.”  Id.  
Rawls also states that public reason limits the types of reasons that properly can be 
drawn upon when “exercise[ing] final political and coercive power over one another 
in enacting laws and in amending their constitution.” Rawls, supra note 50, at 214.  
In short, sometimes Rawls seems to suggest that public reason’s constraints do apply 
to ordinary lawmaking.  No more need be said about the scope of public reason for 
present purposes because the less-strict “criterion of reciprocity” applies to ordinary 
legislation and constitutes a “public good” requirement, as discussed above in text. 
68 See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
1689 (1984). 
69 See Estlund, supra note 59, at 3, 9. 
70 Id. at 4. 
71 Id. at 8.  Crucially, the procedures’ epistemic value also must be “publicly 
recognizable,” that it is to say, the procedure’s tendency to generate correct 
decisions must be “generally acceptable [to citizens] in the way that political 
legitimacy requires.”  Id. 
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Estlund generates an illuminating, involved argument that people 
would be morally obligated to consent to a democratic procedure with these 
characteristics, and that actual consent accordingly is unnecessary just as 
moral obligations are binding without consent.72  The notion of “epistemic 
proceduralism” – that democratic lawmaking must utilize procedures that 
have a tendency to make correct decisions -- thus stands at the center of 
Estlund’s claims.   Though he does not go into the details of institutional 
design,73 his theory implies the existence of some sort of “public good” 
requirement because democracy’s epistemic requirement cannot be satisfied 
if law-makers are permitted to pursue self-serving goals when acting in their 
official capacities.74   
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
Legitimate-Decisionmaking’s “public good” requirement means that 
certain motivations behind governmental action are illegitimate. Accordingly, 
the second component of Republican Legitimacy invites serious inquiry into 
the type of motivations and reasons that legislators properly may rely upon – 
and those that they cannot -- when they legislate.  This will receive further 
consideration later in this Article.75   
C.    Anticipating three arguments against Republican Legitimacy 
Three arguments may be asserted against the claim above that 
Republican Legitimacy is a constitutional principle. First, against the claim 
concerning Legitimate-Decisionmaking’s “public good” requirement 
regarding legislators, it might be argued that regardless of what political 
theorists past and present may have thought, any such requirement is 
inconsistent with the Madisonian system that was adopted in our 
Constitution.  Second, it might be argued that the many well known deficits 
in democracy that were present during the Founding era – best illustrated by 
the exclusion of women, African-Americans, and non-property holding 
whites from voting – undermine the claim that there is a constitutional 
principle of Legitimate-Selection.  Third, it might be argued that what I call 
Republican Legitimacy is already (and better) addressed by what some cases 
and commentators have called “anti-corruption.”  I develop, and refute, each 
of these arguments below.  
                                                 
72 See id. at 10, 117-35. 
73 Id. at 2. 
74 Indeed, Estlund alludes to such a conclusion at one of the few places in his 
book where he briefly considers his theory’s concrete institutional implications. See 
id. at 20 (sharing his “impression[]” that “if points of view get their influence on 
public conclusions by virtue of the wealth they have at their disposal, public 
reasoning will be seriously distorted unless this irrational element of power can 
somehow be countervailed in creative political practice”). 
75 See infra Part IV.C.1(b). 
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1.     The Argument against Legitimate-Decisionmaking:  
Madison and ‘Our Constitution’ 
It might be argued that regardless of what the niceties of political 
theory might suggest, our Constitution’s Madisonian compromise is 
inconsistent with the claim that Legitimate-Decisionmaking is a 
constitutional principle.  In the Federalist Papers, Madison famously wrote 
that men are not “angels”76 and that the Constitution accordingly relies on 
the principles that “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition” and 
that “the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public 
rights.”77 Quoting this, Professor Adrian Vermeuel has argued that Madison 
believed that “suppressing self-interest at its source is infeasible,” and that 
Madison instead chose to “leav[e] self-interested motives in place while 
constricting the opportunities available to self-interested decisionmakers” 
and to thereby “control[] the effects rather than the causes of self-interest.”78  
Similarly, it has been argued that Madison’s ideas are a foundation for, if not 
a precursor of, public choice theory,79 which posits that politics is a forum 
where individuals simply ought to pursue their individual interests.80   
Any such Madisonian critique of public good requirements is 
unavailing for several reasons.  First, it relies on a partial reading – if not a 
misreading -- of Madison.81  Madison’s discussion of “ambition 
counteract[ing] ambition” occurs in the context of his explanation of how 
“the necessary partition of power among the several department as laid down 
in the Constitution” are to be “maintain[ed].”82  Madison thus was discussing 
how the powers of the federal government’s three branches were to be kept 
distinct. Madison’s solution was to “giv[e] to those who administer each 
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist 
encroachments of the others.”83  So  Madison’s discussion of  “personal 
motives” is not a license for legislator’s to pursue their individual preferences 
when legislating, but instead refers to the powers and motivations for  
members of each branch to guard against (what Madison deemed to be) 
problematic encroachments from the other branches.84   
                                                 
76 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (Rossiter ed.)  (“If men 
were angels, no government would be necessary.  If angels were to govern men, 
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.”). 
77 Id. at 322. 
78 VERMUELE, supra note 49, at 36. 
79 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:  A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION. 
80 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM (B. 
Grofman & D. Wittman, eds. 1989). 
81 For a similar argument, see Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public 
Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 38-45 (1985). 
82 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320. 
83 Id. at 321-22. 
84 For a critical discussion of Madison’s view that each department’s powers were 
to be kept distinct, see Mark D. Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94 MINN. L. 
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Indeed, Madison repeatedly speaks of the legislature’s pursuit of the 
“public good” and “public weal,”85 and argues that representative democracy 
is more apt than direct democracy to pursue the public good: the 
delegation of the government . . . to a small number of citizens 
elected by the rest [will] refine and enlarge the public views by 
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, 
whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and 
whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it 
to temporary or partial considerations.86      
Similarly, Madison writes in Federalist 57 that “[t]he aim of every political 
constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess the 
most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of the 
society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for 
keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.”87  
These are not the words of someone who wants or expects legislators to 
pursue their individual interests when they legislate.  To the contrary, 
Madison’s expectation seems to have been that legislators would be better 
suited than citizens to pursue the public good.    
There are other reasons why Madison’s views, whatever they might 
have been, should not be seen as a refutation of the necessity of a “public 
good” requirement.   Madison was addressing the best way of structuring an 
alternative to monarchy, and why the proposed constitution should be 
ratified. The public good requirement, however, concerns something very 
different:  an account of why, and under what conditions, republican 
governments can legitimately coerce their citizens.  While political theorists 
before Madison had labored to justify the legitimacy of the exercise of 
governmental power,88 this was not Madison’s task, most likely because it 
was not the core issue on the American people’s minds at the time of the 
Constitution’s ratification. After all, some form of democracy was surely better 
than monarchy, and that was sufficient to recommend it as the desired 
political form.89  
                                                                                                                         
REV. 105, 1052-57 (2010). 
85 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82. 
86 Id. (emphasis supplied). 
87 THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (Madison), at 350 (emphasis supplied). 
88 For example, explaining the legitimacy of governmental power was central to 
both Locke and Rousseau, as discussed above in text.  Indeed, during debates 
concerning the scope of the franchise in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War, a 
handful of Americans made this argument as well.  See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE 
RIGHT TO VOTE:  THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 11-12 (rev’d ed. 2000).  
89 This should not be surprising, for Madison was not a systematic political 
theorist.  Robert Dahl demonstrates the profound theoretical inadequacies of 
Madison’s political theories, concluding that Madison’s Federalist Papers are better 
understood as an “ideology” that was designed to serve the political purpose of 
finding common ground to facilitate ratification.  See ROBERT A. DAHL, A 
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 4-33. 
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Moreover, questions concerning the legitimacy of a democracy’s 
exercise of power over its citizens may not have had much resonance at that 
time, when only a fraction of citizens had the right to vote or hold office.90   
By contrast, questions of legitimacy are pressing in the modern era, where 
democracy is widespread, monarchy is rare, the concept of political equality 
among citizens is entrenched, and there is pervasive recognition that people 
of good will probably will never converge on what constitutes the “good 
life.”91  In this environment, the question of what legitimates the majority’s 
exercise of power over a dissenting minority is pressing.  Modernity permits 
– if not invites – the progressive refinements of enduring governmental 
institutions that were created in a relatively short period of time by people 
who had limited experience with democracy, and access to virtually no 
models of democratic institutions for guidance.92  We should welcome, not 
denigrate, the opportunity to refine aspects of our democratic system that did 
not receive considered attention from the Founders.   
The previous paragraph may resonate with “living constitutionalists,” 
but would it be acceptable to originalists?  The next subsection explains why 
it should be.   
2.     The Argument against Legitimate-Selection:  the 
‘Democracy-Deficit Refutation’  
Significantly more than half of the adult population did not have the 
franchise in 1789:  all states except New Jersey withheld the franchise from 
women,93 most states had property qualifications,94 slaves could not vote, and 
several states excluded even free Blacks.95  As a matter of principle, it is 
impossible to square such widespread disenfranchisement with Legitimate-
                                                 
90 See KEYSSAR, supra note 88, at 3-21 (describing the limited franchise at that 
time). 
91 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 42, at 386; GAUS, supra note 50, at 2. 
92 See ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION? 8-9 (“It is no detraction from the genius of Leonardo da Vinci to 
say that given the knowledge available in his time he could not possibly have 
designed a workable airplane . . . The knowledge of the Framers – some of them, 
certainly – may well have been the best available in 1787.  But reliable knowledge 
about constitutions appropriate to a large representative republic was, at best, 
meager.  History had produced no truly relevant models of representative 
government on the scale the United States had already attained, not to mention the 
scale it would reach in the years to come.”). 
93 See Keysar, supra note 88, at 43-44.  New Jersey ultimately disenfranchised 
women in 1807.  See id. 
94 Only Vermont, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Georgia had no property 
requirements.  New Hampshire imposed a poll tax, while Pennsylvania  and Georgia 
had requirements that the voter have paid public taxes prior to the election.  Every 
other state had property requirements.  See id. at 306-07.    
95 Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia formally extended the franchise only to 
Whites.  See id. at 306-07.   However, the number of states that excluded Blacks 
“rose steadily from 1790 to 1850.”  Id. at 44. 
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Selection.96  As a doctrinal matter, however, doesn’t the Founding era’s  
democracy-deficit demolish this Article’s claim that Legitimate-Selection is a 
constitutional principle?  No:  any such “democracy-deficit refutation” is 
without force, for three reasons. 
 a.     History 
History provides the first reason.  As Akhil Amar has explained, 
much happened “in the nation’s first eighty years to give rise to a more 
robustly egalitarian and nationalistic conception of republican government 
than had prevailed in the 1780s,” including a “dramatic expansion of suffrage 
rights, at least among white men.”97  When Congress undertook acts in the 
nineteenth century that were predicated on the Guaranty Clause, Congress 
relied upon its more robust contemporary understanding of republicanism, 
not the Framers’. For example, Congress “judg[ed] local republicanism by 
applying dynamic democratic standards in the course of admitting new 
Western states,” ensuring that the new states “met contemporary standards 
of republicanism.”98  Further, influential members of the Reconstruction 
Congress, including Senator Charles Sumner and Representative John 
Bingham, justified Congress’ refusal to readmit the Southern states following 
the Civil War on the ground that those states’ disenfranchisement of free 
Blacks rendered them unrepublican.99  As Amar notes, “by 1865, any state 
that automatically disenfranchised a quarter or more of its freemen – as did 
each ex-rebel state -- was out of the American mainstream in a way that it 
would not have been in 1787.”100  In other words, it was the 1865-understanding 
of republicanism – not the Framers’ understanding – that was the basis for  
refusing automatic readmission of the Southern states after the Civil War. 
This historical record gives rise to the first reason why the 
democracy-deficit refutation is without force: our understandings of 
Republican Legitimacy should not be limited by the rules-of-the-road that 
were in place at our nation’s founding.   Rather, republicanism’s requirements 
are appropriately determined on the basis of contemporary understandings. 
A dynamic approach to understanding republicanism is consistent with  
longstanding historical practice.   
Two possible counter-arguments may be asserted. First, the fact that 
Congress understood republicanism dynamically does not mean this was 
correct; perhaps Congress acted for unprincipled self-serving reasons,101 or 
                                                 
96 Though beyond the scope of this Article, some contemporary exclusions 
might be indefensible as well.  See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) 
(upholding felony disenfranchisement). 
97 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 370. 
98 Id. at 371. 
99 See id. at 370-76. 
100 Id. at 370 (emphasis supplied). 
101 For such a claim, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS 107.  For 
Amar’s response, see AMERICA’S BIOGRAPHY, supra note 97, at 375 & n.44. 
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simply made a mistake.  Second, in the alternative, such dynamic 
interpretation may be appropriate for Congress, but not for courts.  These 
two counter-arguments, however, are refuted by the second reason, discussed 
immediately below, as to why the democracy-deficit refutation is without 
force.  
b.     Meaning versus Application   
 The democracy-deficit refutation has maximal traction under 
originalist premises.  After all, whereas Legitimate-Selection requires 
widespread franchise, the Founders countenanced a system of widespread 
disenfranchisement at both the state and federal levels.  And this 
disenfranchisement was not a result of oversight, but instead was an 
outgrowth of a theory of politics under which voting was seen as a 
“privilege” rather than a right, where only those with a “stake in society” 
were “sufficiently attached to the community and sufficiently affected by its 
laws to have earned the privilege of voting,” and where women were legally 
merged into their husbands and virtually represented by their votes.102  
Though our country’s early democracy-deficit might be troubling even to 
those who do not label themselves “originalists” – for even they think  
“history” and “tradition” are relevant to constitutional interpretation103 -- 
those who do not self-identify as originalists rely on other considerations that 
allow for changing constitutional interpretations.104 The Founding-era  
democratic-deficit, however, might appear to be an intractable obstacle for 
an originalist to conclude that Legitimate-Selection is a constitutional 
principle that requires widespread franchise. 
But this is not so.  Let us assume that an originalist were to agree 
with the textual and structural claims advanced in this Part that there must be 
a constitutional principle of Republican Legitimacy.  Virtually all modern-day 
originalists still could conclude that our country’s early democracy-deficit  
does not limit the scope of our contemporary understanding of Republican 
Legitimacy.  This is because most contemporary originalists draw a 
distinction between constitutional meaning, which they believe to be binding, 
and actual or expected applications of the Constitution, which they believe are 
not binding.105  This distinction allows them to conclude that a specific view 
                                                 
102 See KEYSAR, supra note 88, at 8. 
103 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:  INTERPRETING OUR 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 8. 
104 See, e.g., id. 
105 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review:  A 
Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s ‘Moral Reading’ of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1269, 1284 (1997) (“Mainstream originalists recognize that the Framers’ analysis of 
particular applications could be wrong, or that circumstances could have changed 
and made them wrong”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution 
(And How Not To), 115 YALE L. J. 2037, 2059 (2006) (rejecting a description of 
originalism as being a “version of crude intentionalism that focuses on the specific 
subjective intentions or expectations of individuals as to how a provision might be 
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or practice that coexisted with a constitutional enactment – say the “views or 
expectations of some individuals at the time [of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s adoption] that the [Fourteenth] Amendment’s principle did 
not extend to segregated education” – was a non-binding “application” or 
“mistake[]” that is distinct from the binding original meaning of the 
Fourtheenth Amendment.106     
Mark Greenberg and Harry Litman have provided the most 
important theoretical explanation for the distinction between binding 
meaning and non-binding applications, and it is useful to work through their 
analysis to demonstrate more precisely why an originalist could conclude that 
our country’s early democracy-deficit is a non-binding application, rather 
than a binding meaning, of republicanism.107 Like many other commentators, 
Greenberg and Litman understand “meaning” to refer to a word’s more 
                                                                                                                         
applied” rather than “focusing on the objective linguistic meaning of the words of a 
text (taken in historical context)”);  Randy Barnette, An Originalism for Non-
Originalists, 34 LOYOLA L. REV. 611, 622 (1999) (distinguishing “semantic” from 
“expectations” originalism and concluding that “how the relevant generation of 
ratifiers expected or intended their textual handiwork would be applied to specific 
cases” is relevant only as “circumstantial evidence of what the more technical words 
and phrases in the text might have meant to a reasonable listener.”); Lawrence B. 
Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in LAWRENCE B. SOLUM & ROBERT W. 
BENNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM:  A DEBATE 10-11 (concluding that “it 
is the public meaning of the test (the linguistic meaning) that provides binding law.  
Expectations about the application of the text to particular cases or general types of 
cases provide relevant evidence of linguistic meaning, but it is only evidence”).  It is 
worth noting that the meaning/application distinction also is important for some 
non-originalists.  See, e.g., James Ryan, The New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. xx 
(forthcoming 2012) at 13 (“The Constitution, properly understood, is not frozen in 
time and inextricably linked to the concrete expectations of the framers or ratifiers.  
But neither does its meaning change . . . . What can change, however, is the 
application of those principles over time, based on technological, economic and 
cultural changes.”). 
106 Paulsen, supra note 105, at 2060. 
107 See Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 
GEO. L. J. 569 (1998).  Mitch Berman has commented that Greenberg and Litman’s 
article “demolished” the proposition that “expected applications of constitutional 
provisions are binding on present-day interpreters.”  Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism 
and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 
385 (2007) (commenting that was “demolished” in Greenberg and Litman’s article).  
I concur as to the article’s depth and importance, though I do not agree with all its 
analysis.  I nonetheless rely on Greenberg and Litman’s article for present purposes 
because it has been influential for originalists, and aim to show that originalists have 
reasons internal to their commitments to reject the democracy-deficit refutation. My 
approach is similar to the Rawlsian idea of reasoning from conjecture. See RAWLS, 
supra note 65, at 155-56 (defining conjecture as arguing “from what we believe, or 
conjecture, are other people’s basic doctrines” even though “we do not assert [that 
is to say, personally accept or believe] the premises from which we argue, but [ ] we 
proceed as we do to clear up what we take to be a misunderstanding on others’ 
part”).    
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abstract, general articulation, and understand “application” to refer to the 
concrete particulars that fall within a word’s or principle’s “meaning.”108 
Greenberg and Litman then argue that applications are the result of a 
meaning’s interaction with factors extrinsic to meaning.  In their words, 
“application may not be a reliable guide to meaning”109 because “meaning is 
only one determinant of the things to which the speaker would apply the 
word.”110  Greenberg and Litman go on to claim that a “speaker’s substantive 
beliefs” may affect application,111 and conclude that “disagreement over 
whether a term apples in a particular case can be, and generally is, a substantive 
disagreement, rather than a misunderstanding about the word’s meaning, 
because what a word is applied to depends not only on meaning but also on 
substantive views.”112  
For example, Greenberg and Litman note that the Founders would 
not have expected that the Contract Clause would operate in respect of a 
married woman’s contract.  But this was because, during the Founding era, a 
married woman was not thought to be able to enter into her own contracts; 
her legal personality was conceptualized as having merged with her  
husband’s.  Greenberg and Litman plausibly conclude that the Founders’ 
expectations concerning married women’s contracts are a non-binding 
application, not an aspect of the meaning of the Contract Clause.113  The 
Founder’s expectation that the Contract Clause would not apply to married 
women’s contracts, say Greenberg and Litman, was due to a substantive 
belief external to the meaning of the Contract Clause, namely that married 
women could not create valid contracts.  Accordingly, that expectation is 
non-binding, and an originalist could conclude today that the Contract 
Clause applies to contracts made by married women.114  
Similarly, it seems plausible to say that our country’s early democracy-
deficit (or many aspects of it, at least) was due to substantive beliefs extrinsic 
to the meaning of republicanism:  for instance, the view that women could 
be virtually represented by their husbands, that a woman’s proper place was 
only in the domestic sphere, that women and non-Whites did not have the 
                                                 
108 See Greenberg & Litman, supra note 107, at 586-91; see also SOLUM, supra 
note 105, at 149(“the linguistic meaning of [a] phrase is the more general meaning).  
This is not the only way that one can understand meaning.  For one brief critique, 
See Robert W. Bennett, Living with Originalism, in SOLUM & BENNETT, supra note 
105, at 113 (critiquing the underlying assumption of  many who distinguish between 
meaning and application that “the meaning of vague or general language must itself 
be general”).  A work-in-progress of mine builds on Wittgenstein’s theory of 
meaning to criticize and limit Greenberg and Litman’s argument.  See Mark D. 
Rosen, Stop the Beach and Originalism.  
109 Greenberg & Litman, supra note 107, at 591. 
110 Id. at 588.   
111 Id. at 588-89.   
112 Id. at 590-91 (emphasis supplied). 
113 Id. at 585. 
114 See id. 
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requisite intelligence or moral attributes to participate in politics, or that only 
property-holders had a stake in society.115  All of these are “substantive 
beliefs” that are extrinsic to the meaning of republicanism, and the concrete 
applications they produced accordingly would not be binding on Greenberg 
and Litman’s account.  For this reason, even originalists can reject the 
democracy-deficit refutation. 
Professor  (and former Judge) Michael McConnell has put forward 
another reason for distinguishing between meaning and application.  
McConnell states that “[m]ainstream originalists recognize that the Framers’ 
analysis of particular applications could be wrong, or that circumstances 
could have changed and made them wrong.”116 McConnell’s is a more limited 
justification than Greenberg and Litman’s because on the latters’ account 
applications can properly shift as substantive beliefs change even if the earlier 
substantive belief was not necessarily wrong.  But even McConnell’s more 
limited understanding concerning the distinction between binding meaning 
and non-binding applications would suffice for present purposes:  my guess 
is that most originalists would concede that our country’s early widespread 
franchise exclusions were either “wrong,” or that “circumstances . . . have 
changed and made them wrong” vis-à-vis what republicanism requires.  If so, 
originalists’ understanding of the constitutional principle of Republican 
Legitimacy need not be limited by virtue of our country’s early democracy-
deficit.  And this is yet another reason why originalists can reject the 
democracy-deficit refutation.    
Finally, it is worth noting that both McConnell’s and Greenberg & 
Litman’s accounts provide theoretical justifications for Congress’ dynamic 
approach to understanding what republicanism requires that Amar 
documents.  These accounts also provide a retort to the possibility raised at 
the conclusion of the last subsection that only Congress properly has this 
power:  there is no reason to conclude that courts would not have a role in 
sorting out binding meanings from non-binding applications.    
c.     Post-Guaranty Clause Amendments 
There is a final reason to reject the democracy-deficit refutation.  As 
Professor Amar has forcefully argued, and as many originalists agree, the 
Constitution’s text should be read holistically, taking account of not only the 
original Constitution but its amendments as well.117 “Each amendment aims 
to fit with, and be read as part of, the larger document. Indeed, because the 
                                                 
115 See KEYSAR, supra note 88, at 8. 
116 McConnell, supra note 105, at 1284. 
117 See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword:  The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 26, 29 (2000) (“The American People ratified the Philadelphia Constitution 
not clause by clause, but as a single document. Later generations of Americans have 
added amendments one by one, but no amendment stands alone as a discrete legal 
regime.”).  For a ringing endorsement of Amar’s originalist methodology by another 
important originalist, see Paulsen, supra note 105. 
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People have chosen to affix amendments to the end of the document rather 
than directly rewrite old clauses, a reader can never simply look to an old 
clause and be done with it. Rather, she must always scour later amendments to see if 
they explicitly or implicitly modify the clause at hand.”118   
Accordingly, it would be incorrect to interpret the original Constitution’s 
“republican form of government” clause without taking account of the many 
amendments that have “expanded our democracy by making citizens of 
former slaves, expanding the right to vote to include women and 18-year 
olds, [ ] abolishing the poll tax . . . [and] increased the voice of the people 
over the voice of corporations and insiders by allowing for the direct election 
of Senators.”119  Amar relies on these Amendments to conclude that the 
Guaranty Clause should be read “broadly” and “dynamically” such that 
exclusions from the franchise that were acceptable during the Founding era 
would not be constitutional today:120  “We the People today must be 
expansive even if We the People at one time were less so.”121  Amar’s 
conclusions are not limited to the question of franchise, but extend more 
generally to the circumstances that must obtain for republican government to 
be both legitimate and stable, i.e., to Republican Legitimacy.  
3.     Republican Legitimacy or Anti-Corruption?   
It might be argued that Republican Legitimacy is an unnecessary 
concept because it merely duplicates what some cases and scholarly writing 
has dubbed “anti-corruption.”122  This criticism fails because Republican 
Legitimacy is a doctrinally and conceptually superior framework, for two 
main reasons.  
First, there is more solid textual grounding in the Constitution for 
concluding that “Republican Legitimacy” is an independent constitutional 
principle than there is for “anti-corruption.” There is constitutional text --  
the Guarantee Clause -- that speaks explicitly about republicanism, but none 
that mentions “corruption.”123  Though the Guarantee Clause only extends 
                                                 
118 Id. at 30 (emphasis supplied). 
119 Ryan, supra note 105, at 20. 
120 Amar, supra note 117, at 49-50. 
121 Id. at 50. 
122 See Teachout, supra note 9. 
123 Another phrase akin to Republican Legitimacy, “democratic integrity,” also 
has appeared in some case law.  See, e.g., FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 
449, 522 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting).  While I view the phrase “democratic 
integrity” as being virtually interchangeable with Republican Legitimacy, I prefer the 
latter for three reasons:  (1) “republican” is more accurate because the Justices 
invoking “democratic integrity” have been referring to lawmaking by representatives 
rather than the people themselves, (2) “legitimacy” more accurately describes the 
idea that informs its contents than does “integrity” insofar as Republican Legitimacy 
concerns the preconditions for law to legitimately bind citizens, and (3) the 
terminology “Republican” facilitates recognition that Republican Legitimacy is an 
independent constitutional principle, for reasons explained above in text. I 
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its guarantee to states, it is hard to imagine that the federal government 
would have been charged with the responsibility of guaranteeing states a 
republican form of government if the federal government itself were not 
republican in form. And, of course, the Constitution explicitly creates a 
republican form of government at the federal level by making Congress 
elected by the people124 -- something that Madison trumpeted in the 
Federalist Papers.125 Once it is accepted that the Constitution establishes and 
guarantees republican forms of government at the federal and state levels, the 
conclusion that Republican Legitimacy is itself of constitutional stature 
readily follows: the Constitution’s creation and guarantee of republican forms 
of government  includes the minimum conditions that are necessary to 
ensure the stability and effectiveness of these institutions.126  
It is harder to show that “anti-corruption” is an independent 
constitutional principle.  Indeed, all but one of anti-corruption’s proponents 
have treated it as a compelling government interest,127 not a standalone 
constitutional principle.128 Professor Teachout has provided an elegant and 
illuminating argument that anti-corruption rises to the level of a 
constitutional principle.  While I am very sympathetic to her project, her 
constitutional argument is subject to a fundamental critique from which 
Republican Legitimacy is immune.  Teachout grounds her constitutional 
conclusion on two virtually unassailable premises:  (1) the Founders were 
concerned with the corruption of republican governments, and (2) many 
provisions of the Constitution were directed at countering corruption. 129 But 
                                                                                                                         
recognize – and criticize the fact – that the proponents of “Democratic Integrity” 
have not treated it as a constitutional principle, but instead as a compelling 
governmental interest.  See supra Part III.C.1.   
124 See supra Part II.A for a full discussion of how the Constitution creates a 
republican form of government vis-à-vis both Congress and the President. 
125 See supra note 22.  
126 For the complete argument, see supra Part II.A-B. 
127 While my proposal at present may be subject to the same criticism, see supra 
Part III.C (noting that the caselaw addressing aspects of Republican Legitimacy have 
treated them as compelling governmental interests, not a standalone constitutional 
principle), the doctrinal arguments for elevating Republican Legitimacy to a 
constitutional level are stronger than those for elevating anti-corruption. 
128 Indeed, Professor Issacharoff’s recent article On Political Corruption in the 
Harvard Law Review considered what understanding of corruption could justify 
campaign finance regulations vis-à-vis free speech challenges, but did not argue that 
anti-corruption constituted an independent constitutional principle.  See Samuel 
Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 119-20 (2010).  Supreme 
Court caselaw likewise has treated political corruption as a compelling governmental 
interest.  See infra Part III.C.1; but see Teachout, supra note 9, at 343 (arguing that 
anti-corruption is a “freestanding constitutional principle”).   
129 She rightly observes that “[t]he sizes of the [House of Representatives and the 
Senate], the mode of election, the limits on holding multiple offices, the limitations 
on accepting foreign gifts, and the veto override provision were all considered in 
light of concerns about corruption, and designed to limit legislators’ opportunities to 
serve themselves.”  Teachout, supra note 9, at 354.  Teachout also relies on 
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her conclusion --  that there exists a standalone constitutional anti-corruption 
principle -- does not follow from these premises.  That many constitutional 
provisions are designed to counter corruption hardly establish that there also 
exists a free-floating constitutional anti-corruption principle alongside these 
constitutionally-created anti-corruption features.  After all, it could equally 
(or, arguably, even more persuasively) be said that the specific institutional 
features that the Constitution establishes to counter corruption exhaust the 
Constitution’s anti-corruption provisions.  
Second, “Republican Legitimacy” is conceptually superior to anti-
corruption insofar as it better indicates its appropriate content than does 
anti-corruption.  My critique of Citizens United in Part IV demonstrates this 
proposition at length.130 The explanation of Republican Legitimacy’s 
conceptual superiority can begin here, though, with a critical analysis of 
Professor Teachout’s definition of political corruption.  She says that political 
corruption is (1) “the use of [the] public forum to pursue private ends” and 
that (2) its “centerpiece” is “intent.”131  From the vantage point of 
Republican Legitimacy, the first part of Teachout’s definition is accurate but 
incomplete; it correctly points to Legitimate-Decisionmaking, but 
problematically omits Legitimate-Selection. To illustrate the costs of 
Teachout’s conception, it provides no basis for criticizing partisan 
gerrymandering by stalwart republicans who aim to minimize the number of 
elected democrats not for the pursuit of “private ends,” but because they 
earnestly believe the democrats’ agenda to be bad for the country.  
Republican Legitimacy, by contrast, provides a basis for concluding that such 
political gerrymandering is wrong even if the gerrymanderers were not 
pursuing “private ends.”132      
The second part of Teachout’s definition – the intent requirement – 
is flatly mistaken from the perspective of Republican Legitimacy.  The 
legitimacy of the republican system can be undercut by negligence, oversight, 
and even well-intended actions.  Actions that threaten Republican Legitimacy 
accordingly should be deemed unconstitutional regardless of intent.  While 
corruption without wrongful intent might well be an oxymoron, intent’s 
irrelevance makes perfect sense within the conceptual framework of 
“Republican Legitimacy.”    
Interestingly, Professor Issacharoff’s recent Harvard Law Review 
article On Political Corruption  actually strengthens the case for Republican 
Legitimacy.  This is so because the conception of “political corruption” that 
                                                                                                                         
prohibition on titles of nobility, the treaty-making power, and the jury requirement 
in federal courts to ground her thesis.  See id.  
130 See infra Part IV.C.   
131 Teachout, supra note 9, at 382; see also id. at 374-75 (defending the 
“understanding of corruption [that] focuses the discussion on the intent” of the 
actors). 
132 See infra Part IV.B (discussing political gerrymandering from the perspective 
of Republican Legitimacy).  
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Issacharoff ultimately champions is virtually identical to Republican 
Legitimacy.  Look carefully at Issacharoff’s analysis: 
Any constitutional test resting on corruption as the evil to be 
avoided begs for a definition of the good, or, in this case, the 
uncorrupted.  As in many areas of law in which the good state 
resists simple definition, the first insight may come from process 
questions – which campaign finance procedures are likely to promote 
desirable forms of democratic governance and which are likely to promote 
infirmities in democracy?133  
Since Issacharoff is discussing campaign finance, it is clear that when 
he speaks of “democratic governance” he actually means “representative 
democracy.”  And representative democracy, of course, is interchangeable 
with republicanism.  If Issacharoff’s aim is to generate legal tests that 
“promote desirable forms of [representative] democratic governance” and 
avoid “infirmities in [representative] democracy,” it would seem that 
“corruption” doesn’t perform any real analytical work.  Standing at the center 
of Issacharoff’s analysis, instead, are considerations of what makes republican 
forms of government work well – considerations that are more accurately 
captured by the moniker Republican Legitimacy.  It is better to use the more 
accurate terminology because, as will be explained shortly, the term 
“corruption” is misleading.134       
III.     THE CASE LAW BEARING ON REPUBLICAN LEGITIMACY 
Having derived Republican Legitimacy through textual and structural 
analysis of the Constitution, and elucidating Republican Legitimacy’s 
contents through political theory, this Part shows to what extent  Republican 
Legitimacy can be said to be already present in the Supreme Court’s decided 
case law.  To provide a quick overview, the two cases discussed in Part III.A 
provide some basis – albeit an inadequately theorized one -- for concluding 
that Legitimate-Selection is a constitutional principle.  Part III.B shows  
many other cases where the Court has recognized the components of 
Republican Legitimacy.   
These decisions are exceedingly helpful for three reasons.  They   
help flesh out the contents of Republican Legitimacy,  authenticate (for those 
who put trust in inductive reasoning) the conclusions of Part II.B’s  top-
down, deductive reasoning, and  provide a precedential foothold for this 
Article’s claim.  But the case law does not give Republican Legitimacy its full 
due – and hence does not qualify as decisive precedent for this Article’s  
claim -- for two reasons.  First, most of the cases treat the preservation of the 
conditions necessary to maintain the legitimacy of republicanism as 
sufficiently important governmental interests to justify regulation, but not as 
matters having independent constitutional status.  Second, most of the cases 
have assimilated the preservation of the conditions necessary to maintain 
                                                 
133 Issacharoff, supra note 123, at 126 (emphasis supplied). 
134 See infra Part IV.C (critiquing Citizens United). 
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republicanism into individual rights doctrines, rather than recognizing them 
as aspects of a structural constitutional principle.   Part III.C explains why 
these two limits of the case law are significant.  In so doing, Part III 
establishes why it is important that Republican Legitimacy be recognized as 
(a) standalone constitutional principle that is (b) structural rather than rights-
based.  
A.     The Most Direct Precedent for the Proposition that Republican Legitimacy 
is an Independent Constitutional Principle 
There is one case (possibly two) in which the Supreme Court has 
recognized that the prerequisites of representative democracy themselves can 
have constitutional status.  It makes sense to discuss the cases 
chronologically because the second case relied on the first.   
Powell v. McCormack135 invoked a “fundamental principle of our 
representative democracy” as a guide to interpreting a constitutional grant of 
power to Congress.  The question was whether the provision that “[e]ach 
House shall be the Judge of the . . . Qualifications of its own Members” gave 
the House the power to exclude a duly elected member on grounds apart 
from the three requirements (age, citizenship, and residency) specified 
elsewhere in the Constitution.136  The Court held that “the Constitution does 
not vest in the Congress a discretionary power to deny membership by a 
majority vote,” relying inter alia on “an examination of the basic principles of 
our democratic system . . .”137 A congressional power to discretionarily 
exclude duly elected congresspersons, continued the Court, would violate the 
“fundamental principle of our representative democracy” that “the people 
should choose whom they please to govern them.”138  
Powell’s principle of “representative democracy” is synonymous with 
the contemporary understanding of republicanism.139  Powell’s principle is an 
aspect of the first component of Republican Legitimacy, i.e., Legitimate-
Selection.  And Powell is surely correct that a discretionary congressional 
power to exclude duly elected congresspersons would undermine the 
legitimacy of the representative process.  For these reasons, Powell is strong 
precedent in support of Republican Legitimacy (or at least its first 
component).   
But there are two important caveats.  First, Powell does not explain 
from where its crucial decisional principle comes, but merely asserts it ipse 
                                                 
135 395 U.S. 486, 547-48 (1969). 
136See U.S. CONST. ART. I, §2, cl. 2 (“No person shall be a Representative who 
shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a 
Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of 
that State in which he shall be chosen.”). 
137 395 U.S. at 547-48 (emphasis supplied).  The Court also considered the 
Framers’ intent “to the extent to which it could be determined.”  Id. 
138 Id. 
139 See supra note 22. 
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dixit.  The derivation provided earlier in this Article provides solid grounding 
for Powell’s principle of “representative democracy.”  Second, Powell did not 
necessarily hold that its principle of “representative democracy” had 
constitutional status; Powell used representative democracy as an interpretive 
rule for construing a constitutional text, and interpretive rules do not 
necessarily themselves have the status of a constitutional principle.  
Notwithstanding the two above caveats, the Supreme Court treated 
Powell’s “fundamental principle” as a full-fledged constitutional principle in 
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.140  Thornton struck down an amendment to 
Arkansas’ constitution that set term limits for that state’s federal 
representatives.  Thornton’s self-proclaimed “most important” ground for its 
decision141 was that term limits violated the “fundamental principle of our 
representative democracy [that] the people should choose whom they please 
to govern them.”142  In so doing, Thornton treated Powell’s principle as a 
constitutional principle, for Thornton considered it a sufficient basis for 
overturning the Arkansas law.143  “Representative democracy” is synonymous 
with republicanism, and Thornton’s holding squarely concerned republicanism, 
striking down an aspect of the electoral system that the Court believed 
interfered with the process by which the people select their representatives.  
Thornton accordingly is solid precedent for the proposition that Legitimate-
Selection is a constitutional principle.    
But there are gaps in Thornton’s analysis.  First, Thornton does not give 
a satisfactory explanation of the source of the “fundamental principle of our 
representative democracy;” it merely cites to Powell, which in turn merely 
asserted it.  Second, Thornton provides little guidance as to its constitutional 
principle’s appropriate scope.  Fortunately, this Article’s earlier analysis in 
Parts II.A and B addresses both these lacks.     
B.    Additional Cases That Address the Two Components of Republican 
Legitimacy 
Many cases have recognized the significance of considerations that 
fall under the two components of Republican Legitimacy. 
1.     The First Component:  Legitimate-Selection  
Let us first consider caselaw that has addressed matters that fall 
under the first component of Republican Legitimacy, Legitimate-Selection.  
The 1969 decision of Kramer v. Union Free School District,144 concerned the 
constitutionality of a statute that  barred an adult who lived with his parents 
from voting in a school board election.  “[S]tatutes distributing the franchise 
constitute the foundation of our representative society.  Any unjustified 
                                                 
140 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
141 Id. at 806. 
142 Id. at 783 (quoting Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969)). 
143 Id. at 783. 
144 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
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discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs or in the 
selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of representative 
government.”145 Kramer struck down the statute, but on equal protection 
grounds.146 It did not understand its concerns to be an independent 
constitutional principle.     
The per curium decision in Purcell v. Gonzalez147 also addressed 
Legitimate-Selection when it tied its reasoning to the conditions that are 
necessary for republicanism to successfully operate.  Purcell vacated an 
interlocutory injunction, thereby allowing state and county officials to apply 
Arizona’s new voter identification rules.  The Court explained that 
“[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is essential to the 
functioning of our participatory democracy.”148 But Purcell held that 
“preserving the integrity of [a state’s] election process” constituted a 
“compelling interest,”149 not an independent constitutional principle.  
 The most extensive discussion of the considerations that fall under 
the rubric of Legitimate-Selection is found in the campaign finance case law.   
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission150 used the concept of Legitimate-
Selection to frame its discussion of a century of federal campaign regulations:  
More than a century ago the ‘sober-minded Elihu Root’ advocated 
legislation that would prohibit political contributions by 
corporations in order to prevent ‘the great aggregations of wealth, 
from using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly,’  to elect 
legislators who would ‘vote for their protection and the 
advancement of their interests as against those of the public.’ In 
Root's opinion, such legislation would ‘strik[e] at a constantly 
growing evil which has done more to shake the confidence of the 
plain people of small means of this country in our political 
institutions than any other practice which has ever obtained since 
the foundation of our Government.’ The Congress of the United 
States has repeatedly enacted legislation endorsing Root's 
judgment.151 
Supreme Court Justices also have relied on considerations of 
Legitimate-Selection when striking down campaign finance regulations.  In 
Randall v. Sorrell,152 the Court found unconstitutional a  state campaign finance 
statute that imposed a $200 per-candidate per-election contribution limit for 
candidates for state office.   Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Alito, explained that although contribution limits are not per se 
unconstitutional, courts must “recognize the existence of some lower bound” 
                                                 
145 Id. at 626. 
146 Id. at 630-33. 
147 549 U.S. 1 (2006). 
148 Id. at 7. 
149 Id. 
150 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
151 Id. at 115 (internal quotations omitted). 
152 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
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because “[a]t some point the constitutional risks to the democratic electoral 
process become too great.”153  Contribution limits that are too low can “harm 
the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective 
campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing electoral 
accountability.”154  Though Breyer’s reasoning reflected structural concerns, 
his plurality opinion grounded its holding in the First Amendment.155  
2.    The Second Component:  Legitimate-Decisionmaking 
Concerns that are part of the second component of Republican 
Legitimacy, Legitimate-Decisionmaking, also have been recognized by the 
Supreme Court.  But before turning to that case law, three preliminary 
observations are in order.  To date, the Court’s analysis has been institution-
specific, with each case focusing on the branch of government (the 
legislature, the judiciary, and the executive) whose actions were the subject of 
the litigation.   This is sensible insofar as each institution is genuinely 
distinctive156 in respect of both its vulnerabilities to improper decisionmaking 
and as to what constitutes improper decisionmaking; for instance, a greater 
degree of objectivity is expected of courts than of legislatures.  Nonetheless, 
that the Court has recognized a category of wrongful decisionmaking vis-à-
vis all three branches confirms the proposition that Legitimate-
Decisionmaking is a meaningful category in respect of governmental action, as a 
general matter.  
a.     The Legislature 
Proceeding to the case law, the Court long has recognized 
Legitimate-Decisionmaking vis-à-vis legislatures.  In United States v. 
Wurzbach,157 a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Holmes upheld a 
statute that barred members of Congress from receiving contributions for 
“any political purpose whatever” from any other federal employees.  The 
Court upheld the statute on the grounds of Legitimate-Decisionmaking:  
“Congress may provide that its officers and employees” shall not be “subjected 
to pressure for money for political purposes, upon or by others of their kind, while 
they retain their office or employment.”158   
Consider as well the recent decision in Nevada Commission on Ethics v. 
Carrigan.159  Nevada law prohibits state and municipal legislators from 
                                                 
153 Id. at 248 (emphasis supplied). 
154 Id. at 249. 
155 Id. at 261-62. 
156 For an extended analysis of how the different institutional characteristics of 
each branch of government should influence constitutional doctrine, See Mark D. 
Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1513 (2005). 
157 280 U.S. 396, 398 (1930). 
158 Id. at 398-99 (emphasis supplied). 
159 131 S. Ct. 2343 (2011). 
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“vot[ing] upon or advocat[ing] the passage or failure of” any “matter with 
respect to which the independence of judgment of a reasonable person in his 
situation would be materially affected by . . . [h]is commitment in a private 
capacity to the interests of others.”160  The Court upheld Nevada’s law 
against a First Amendment challenge because, inter alia, such “generally 
applicable conflict-of-interest recusal rule[s]” have been “commonplace for 
over 200 years” in both Congress and state legislatures.161  For example, 
within a week of the House of Representative’s having obtained a quorum, it 
enacted a rule that “[n]o member shall vote on any question, in the event of 
which he is immediately and particularly interested.”162  And although “[t]he 
first Senate rules did not include a recusal requirement, . . . Thomas Jefferson 
adopted one when he was President of the Senate.”163  It provided that that 
“where the private interests of a member are concerned in a bill or question, 
he is to withdraw.  And where such an interest has appeared, his voice [is] 
disallowed . . .”164   
Interestingly, Jefferson’s Senate rule justified itself by resort to 
foundational principles of political theory similar to those invoked above in 
Part II.B:  “In a case so contrary not only to the laws of decency, but to the 
fundamental principles of the social compact, which denies to any man to be 
a judge in his own case, it is for the honor of the house that his rule, of 
immemorial observance, should be strictly adhered to.”165  Buttressing this 
Article’s claim that Legitimate-Decisionmaking is not branch-specific but 
instead is applicable to governmental action in general, the Senate drew upon 
an analogy from the judiciary, noting that a person may not be a “judge in his 
own case.”166  The Carrigan decision likewise relied on the fact that “[f]ederal 
conflict-of-interest rules applicable to judges also date back to the founding.”167 
                                                 
160 Nev.Rev.Stat. §281A.420(2), cited in Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2347.  The Court 
understood that the statute barred legislators from “advocating [the proposal in 
which he has a conflict’s] passage or failure during the legislative debate.”  Id.   
161 Id. at 2348.  For more of the majority’s reasoning, See infra note 167. 
162 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 99 (1789), quoted in Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2348. 
163 See Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2348. 
164 A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE 
OF THE UNITED STATES 31 (1801), quoted in Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2348. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 2348 (emphasis supplied).  Curiously, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in  
Carrigan did not uphold Nevada’s law on the ground that it was backed by a 
compelling governmental interest, but instead concluded that no speech rights were 
implicated for two reasons. See id. at 2350.  First, legislative power “is not personal 
to the legislator but belongs to the people; the legislator has no personal right to it.”  
Id.  Second, “the act of voting [by a legislator] symbolizes nothing” and therefore is 
not an “act of communication” to which the First Amendment applies. Id. at 2350.   
The majority’s reasoning is peculiar.  Justices Kennedy and Alito each wrote 
separate concurrences, with which I largely agree, strongly criticizing the majority’s 
premise that anti-recusal laws do not implicate speech.  See id. at 2352-53 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring); id. at 2354 (“I do not agree with the opinion of the Court insofar as 
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The concern of Legitimate-Decisionmaking also is present in the 
modern campaign finance case law.  Since the landmark 1976 decision of 
Buckley v. Valeo, the Court has held that “[t]o the extent that large 
contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and 
potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative 
democracy is undermined.”168 Behind Buckley’s delegitimation of quid pro 
quo contributions is a theory of Legitimate-Decisionmaking that identifies 
some motivations behind congressional decisionmaking as being wrongful.   
To be sure, Legitimate-Decisionmaking’s scope vis-à-vis Congress 
has been a matter of deep controversy at the Supreme Court.  Many cases 
have understood Legitimate-Decisionmaking to demand the satisfaction of 
strict criteria.   For example, in upholding the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act’s  ban on national parties' involvement with soft money, the majority 
opinion in McConnell v. FEC169  cited to earlier cases that had recognized the 
legitimacy of regulations aimed at combating “undue influence on an 
officeholder's judgment”170 and “the broader threat from politicians too 
compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”171  McConnell also provided 
the Court’s most expansive discussion to date of its theory of Legitimate-
Decisionmaking when it spoke of the “danger that officeholders will decide 
issues not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according 
to the wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued by 
the officeholder.”172 However, in the Court’s more recent decision on this 
issue – the controversial Citizens United case -- a five Justice majority retreated 
from McConnell’s  view, holding instead that quid-pro-quo exchanges are the 
only types of illegitimate decisionmaking that can be regulated by 
Congress.173  Justice Stevens’ lengthy dissent for four Justices reiterated 
McConnell’s understanding that “undue influence” extends beyond quid-pro-
                                                                                                                         
it suggests that restrictions upon legislators’ voting are not restrictions upon 
legislators’ speech”) (Alito, J., concurring).  Further, as to the majority’s first reason, 
it is in tension with Citizen United’s confirmation of corporations’ first amendment 
rights despite the fact that corporations cannot be said to have “personal” rights.  
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899-900. It is more plausible to conclude that 
restricting legislators’ ability to advocate and vote indeed restrict speech, but that 
they are not “impermissible restrictions on freedom of speech” because there are 
sufficiently important interests – preserving Republican Legitimacy – to justify 
them.  Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2355 (Alito, J., concurring). 
168 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-7 (1976).  This holding has been reaffirmed 
countless times, including in the Court’s recent decision of Citizens United, a decision 
that constitutes a severe retrenchment of campaign finance laws.  See Citizens 
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909-10 (2010).  
169 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
170 Id. at 150 (quoting FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 
Committee, 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001)). 
171 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 150 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Missouri PAC, 528 U.S. 
377, 389 (2000)). 
172 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 153. 
173 See infra Part IV.C.1. 
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quo exchanges.174 Justice Stevens said regulations combating such influences 
serve as “safeguard[s]” to protect the very “legitimacy of our political 
system” against “threat[s] to republican self-government.”175  Yet as 
important as Citizens United is in having cut back its understanding of 
Legitimate-Decisionmaking, it is important to recognize that all Justices still 
accept some theory of Legitimate-Decisionmaking vis-à-vis Congress insofar 
as quid-pro-quo exchanges still are deemed illegitimate by all the Justices. 
b.     The Executive Branch 
Legitimate-Decisionmaking also has been applied to the executive 
branch in the caselaw upholding limits on the political activities of federal 
executive branch employees.  An 1882 case upheld a law prohibiting federal 
employees “from giving or receiving money for political purposes from or to 
other employees of the government.”176  More recent cases177 upheld the 
Hatch Act, which bars federal employees from taking an “active part in 
political management or political campaigns.”178 The Court upheld a wide 
array of statutory prohibitions179 on Legitimate-Decisionmaking grounds,180 
crediting Congress’ judgment that “an actively partisan governmental 
personnel threatens good administration . . .”181  The Court endorsed 
Congress’ concern regarding the “danger” to the public that “governmental 
favor may be channeled through political connections” if governmental 
workers were permitted to engage in the proscribed activities.182  The Court 
upheld Congress’ support for the “principle of required political neutrality 
for classified public servants” so as to promote “integrity in the discharge of 
                                                 
174 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
175 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 963-64; 968-69. 
176 Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 967 (describing holding of Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 
(1882)). 
177 See U.S. Civil Service Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, 
413 U.S. 548 (1973); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
178 Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 554. 
179 The Hatch Act barred employees of the executive branch from “holding a 
party office, working at the polls, and acting as party paymaster for other party 
workers,” and Congress also could ban such employees from “organizing a political 
party or club; actively participating in fund-raising activities for a partisan candidate 
or political party; becoming a partisan candidate for, or campaigning for, an elective 
public office; actively managing the campaign of a partisan candidate for public 
office; initiating or circulating a partisan nominating petition or soliciting votes for a 
partisan candidate for public office; or serving as a delegate, alternate or proxy to a 
political party convention.” Id. at 556.  
180 Id. at 556 (holding that “neither the First Amendment nor any other 
provision of the Constitution invalidates a law barring this kind of partisan political 
conduct by federal employees”)   
181 Id. at 555 (internal quotation omitted). 
182 Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 98; Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 555 (quoting and 
reaffirming). 
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official duties”183 and to “deal with what many sincere men believe is a 
material threat to the democratic system.”184 
c.     The Judiciary 
Finally, as to Legitimate-Decisionmaking in the judiciary, consider the 
recent decision of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.185  Caperton held that a 
state supreme court justice should have recused himself from a case in which 
the president and chief executive officer of one of the parties in a case had 
made substantial campaign contributions for the justice’s re-election, at a 
time when it was likely that the corporation would be seeking review of a trial 
court’s entry of a $50 million judgment against the corporation.  The 
Supreme Court grounded its ruling in the proposition that “[a] fair trial in a 
fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process,”186 and held that a judge 
must recuse himself where “there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias’” 
on the basis of “a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human 
weakness.”187  Caperton found this standard to have been met “when a person 
with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and 
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds 
or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or 
imminent.”188  
C.     Limitations of the Case Law 
The case law surveyed above in Part III.B supports this Article’s 
claim that Republican Legitimacy is an independent structural constitutional 
principle,189 but does not fully establish the Article’s claim for two reasons. 
 1.     Compelling Interests versus Independent 
Constitutional Principles 
Apart from Thornton (and arguably Powell), the case law examined 
above treated Legitimate-Selection and Legitimate-Decisionmaking as 
governmental interests sufficient to justify governmental regulation (generally  
“compelling” governmental interests), but not as components of a 
standalone constitutional principle.  While useful, that case law does not go 
far enough because there are four critical differences between a compelling 
governmental interest and a full-fledged constitutional principle.  I sketch 
these four differences below, and fully develop them later in Part IV. 
First, whereas a compelling governmental interest is a defense for 
government regulation judicially challenged as infringing a constitutional 
                                                 
183 Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 97. 
184 Id. at 99. 
185 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
186 Id. at 2259 (internal quotation omitted). 
187 Id. at 2262-63 (internal quotations omitted). 
188 Id. at 2263-64. 
189 See supra p. 26. 
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commitment judicially protected by strict scrutiny, independent 
constitutional principles also can operate as a sword to challenge governmental 
action.  For instance, a compelling governmental interest could not have 
been used to judicially invalidate Indiana’s voter-identification law in the 
Crawford case, whereas a constitutional principle could have.190      
Second, a constitutional interest may motivate legislatures differently 
than would a compelling governmental interest.  Legislators may act more 
responsibly if they believe their participation is necessary to fully realize a 
constitutional commitment than if they are told that there is a “compelling 
governmental interest” that that they act in a particular way.191  After all, 
compelling governmental interests are (mere) policies, whereas constitutional 
commitments are something more.192   
Third, the failure to recognize a full-fledged constitutional principle 
distorts analysis when that principle runs up against a competing  
constitutional commitment.193  In such a circumstance, the failure to 
recognize the constitutional consideration – and treating it  instead as 
“merely” a compelling governmental interest -- can erroneously oversimplify 
the situation, making it appear that only a single constitutional value is at 
stake. The overlooked constitutional principle might not be given the dignity 
it deserves when a legislature considers whether to  legislate or a court 
reviews legislation.   
Fourth, recognizing that there are competing constitutional 
considerations makes clear that the situation at hand involves a conflict of 
competing constitutional commitments.194  This should have doctrinal 
consequences for courts.  The understanding that a legislature’s decision 
reflects a considered effort to harmonize competing constitutional 
commitments, rather than a decision implicating only a single constitutional 
principle, should generally lead to greater judicial deference to the legislative 
judgment because legislatures are better suited than courts, on grounds of 
both institutional competency and democratic legitimacy, to reconcile 
competing and incommensurable constitutional commitments.195 
For all these reasons, there is a meaningful difference between a  
compelling governmental interest and an independent constitutional 
principle.  
                                                 
190 See infra Part IV.A. 
191 See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS 
(showing congressional interpretation and implementation of the Constitution). 
192 See Rosen, supra note 21. 
193 See infra Part IV.C.2. 
194 See id. 
195 See id. 
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2.   The Distinction Between Individual Constitutional 
Rights and Structural Constitutional Principles  
This Article’s claim is that Republican Legitimacy is a structural 
constitutional principle consisting of the conditions necessary to ensure that 
both our constitutionally created federal government as well as the States are  
functional and stable republican governments.196 With the exception of the 
Thornton and Powell decisions, however, the cases have addressed aspects of 
Republican Legitimacy in the course of analyzing individual rights-based 
claims based on the equal protection and free speech clauses.  This is a 
second respect in which most of the case law has not given Republican 
Legitimacy its full due:  the minimal conditions necessary for Legitimate-
Selection and Legitimate-Decisionmaking are facets of constitutional 
structure, not aspects of individual rights. 
But does it matter whether a constitutional principle is deemed to be 
individual rights-based or structural?   A long-standing scholarly debate 
addresses this very question.  On the one side, Professors Richard H. Pildes, 
Samuel Issacharoff, and Pam Karlan have argued that many election law   
questions implicate structural constitutional principles, and that attempting to 
address structural constitutional harms by rights-based constitutional 
doctrines is problematic.197  On the other side, Professor Richard Hasen, 
denies the existence of structural constitutional principles in the election law 
context.198 Professor Guy Charles splits the baby, arguing that “it is 
immaterial whether one casts political rights claims in a structuralist or 
individualist frame.”199  
This Article falls squarely on, and builds upon, the Pildes, Issacharoff 
and Karlan side of the debate.  It does so in two ways, critically and  
constructively.  First, in the subsection immediately below I critically analyze 
Professor Hasen’s and Professor Charles’ arguments against structural 
constitutional principles.  The constructive support of structuralism appears 
after that, in Part IV, where I identify reasons why constitutional rights 
cannot be counted on to adequately protect structural constitutional 
                                                 
196 Those aspects of Republican Legitimacy that help implement the guarantee 
that the states also have republican forms of government likewise are concerned 
with structure. 
197 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term – Foreword:  The 
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28 (2004); Samuel 
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:  Partisan Lockups of the Democratic 
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal:  The 
Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 
1345 (2001). 
198 See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW:  
JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE  138-156 (NYU 
Press 2003).   
199 Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1131 
(2005).   
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principles200 and show fallout from the Court’s failure to treat Republican 
Legitimacy as a structural principle.   
a. Critiquing Professor Hasen’s Wholesale Rejection of Structural 
Principles in the Electoral Context 
Professor Hasen, among this nation’s leading election law scholars, 
argues that “structural theories are all about individual and group rights after 
all.”201  He “see[s] nothing normatively improper (much less constitutionally 
intolerable) about a practice that causes no harm to individuals or groups of 
individuals.”202   
The effort to collapse structural concerns into individual and group 
rights is mistaken for several reasons.  First, it is inconsistent with 
constitutional text.  Some constitutional provisions are primarily directed to 
securing the interests of individuals, others to constituting or securing 
governmental institutions.  It is no surprise that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s charges that States shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty 
or property without due process of law” or “deny to any person . . . the equal 
protection of the laws” have been primarily conceptualized as generating 
individual rights despite the fact that due process and equal protection have  
downstream consequences as to how governmental institutions operate.  
Conversely, the requirement that the President “give to the Congress 
Information of the State of the Union,” and those of the Bicameralism and 
Presentment Clauses, are best understood as structural requirements that 
determine the character of governmental institutions, though they also have 
downstream effects on individuals.203 
Second, Hasen’s effort to collapse the distinction between structure 
and individual rights is troublesome because individual rights and structural 
interests are conceptually distinct.  In one direction, individual rights can be 
violated even if a governmental institution cannot be improved upon.  For 
example, a rogue or absent-minded police officer may wrongfully search a 
citizen’s home despite the fact that a fully adequate governmental policy is in 
place.  In other words, even if there’s nothing structurally wrong with a 
governmental institution or policy, individual rights can be harmed.  In the 
other direction, there can be structural damage even if a governmental action 
                                                 
200 First, individual rights doctrines focus attention primarily on individuals, and 
in so doing can lead courts to overlook structural harms; it is easy to overlook 
considerations that doctrine doesn’t indicate are legally significant. See infra text and 
note 248. Second, sub-doctrines developed in (and sensible in) the context of 
individual rights may have unintended consequences if applied to structural 
constitutional values.  See infra text and note 255; see infra text and note 262. 
201 See HASEN, supra note 198, at 156. 
202 Id. at 152. 
203 For example, the State of the Union informs citizens, and the Bicameralism 
and Presentment requirements determine what creates federal law that is binding on 
citizens. 
[2012]                                        Republican Legitimacy                                 38 
imposes no harm to an individual. Consider, for example, a hypothetical 
statute giving Congress the power to approve the ambassadors proposed by 
the President. Because the Constitution grants the President the power to 
appoint ambassadors with the advice and consent of the Senate,204 such a 
statute would enlarge the House’s power vis-à-vis ambassadors and 
correspondingly diminish the Senate’s and President’s powers.  This would 
impose a structural harm to the governmental system established by the 
Constitution, despite the fact that it would not seem to harm individual 
citizens.205     
To generalize, much of what the Constitution does is to establish 
governmental entities and determine the relationship among them.  There is 
no reason to think that there cannot be constitutional harms to these 
inanimate governmental structures.  And, indeed, the Supreme Court long 
has policed against improper incursions against these institutions by means 
of the structural constitutional principles known as separation of powers and 
federalism. 
Professor Hasen probably does not deny the existence of structural 
principles in general, but only thinks that election law should be analyzed 
under the rubric of equality, not structure.206  Even this more moderate 
position is untenable because it is not the case that all constitutional concerns 
in the voting context boil down to equality.207   Republican Legitimacy, for 
instance, concerns what is necessary to maintain the legitimacy and stability 
of the republican forms of government that the Constitution creates and 
guarantees, matters that are not reducible to “equality.” It does not slight 
Equal Protection to recognize that democracy’s rules-of-the-road  implicate 
other constitutional principles as well.   
At least part of what drives Professor Hasen is the hope of having 
“apples-to-apples comparisons” among constitutional principles.208  But an 
attempt to reduce everything to equal protection is misbegotten if, as this 
Article’s analysis suggests, multiple constitutional principles are implicated in 
the rules-of-the-road context.209 Analysis unavoidably becomes complex 
when multiple incommensurable constitutional principles point to different 
outcomes.  The attempt to reduce distinctive, incommensurable 
constitutional commitments into a single constitutional currency purchases 
                                                 
204 U.S. Const. Art. II, §2, cl. 2. 
205 The conclusion would be no different if one were to instead characterize the 
statute as harming every United States citizens’ right to have an ambassador chosen 
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
206 See id. at 153-56. 
207 Professor Hasen summarizes his book as an argument that courts’ sole role is 
to be the actor of “last resort who must referee some high-stakes political battles 
and protect basic rights of political equality” and closes his book with a chapter 
entitled “Equality, Not Structure.”    
208 Id. at 156. 
209 To be specific:  Republican Legitimacy, as well as such individual rights 
principle as free speech and equal protection. 
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resolvability only at the cost of distortion.   
Further evidence that there is a meaningful distinction between 
individual rights and structural constitutional interests is that this distinction 
already is embedded in much constitutional doctrine.210 For example, the 
distinction between individual rights and structural interests helps explain 
why some constitutional matters can be waived and others cannot.211  It is the 
individual, personal nature of the right against self-incrimination and the 
Sixth Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure that makes these 
constitutional matters waivable by individuals.  Conversely, as the Supreme 
Court has explained, federalism’s constitutional requirements may not be 
waived by States because they are structural.212 Likewise, parties to a litigation 
cannot waive Article III’s “structural” protections,213 which guard the “role 
of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite 
government.”214  Similarly, it is unthinkable that the President or Congress 
could waive Presentment.  To generalize, individuals cannot waive structural 
constitutional requirements because such matters are not “theirs” to waive 
on account of their structural character. Permitting waiver of structural 
values would put such interests at risk.  
Professor Hasen also argues that structuralism reflects “judicial 
hubris” and that courts should not “make deeply contested normative 
judgments about the appropriate functioning of the political process” that 
structuralism entails.215  This argument fails because “[s]tructuralism is not 
necessarily juriscentric . . .”216  The question of whether a structural principle 
exists is wholly distinct from the question of which institution, courts or 
legislatures, is primarily (or exclusively) responsible for implementing it.217  
Indeed, several structural constitutional principles are exclusively or primarily 
the responsibility of Congress; for instance, the Constitution’s guarantee that 
                                                 
210This argument is a species of the inductive reasoning that undergirds common 
law reasoning insofar as it draws a general principle from decisions that were 
rendered in specific contexts.  See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE 
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 22-23 (1921) (the “common law does not work from 
pre-established truths of universal and inflexible validity to conclusions derived 
from them deductively,” but “[i]ts method is inductive, and it draws its 
generalizations from particulars.”). 
211See, e.g., Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) (“litigants may 
waive their personal right to have an Article III judge preside over a civil trial.  The 
most basic rights of criminal defendants are similarly subject to waiver”) (emphasis 
supplied); See generally Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 810 
(2003). 
212 NY v United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
213 See CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1986). 
214 See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985). 
215 Hasen, supra note 201, at 153. 
216 See Charles, supra note 199, at 1113. 
217For example, constitutional principles that are non-justiciable political 
questions exist and are implemented by non-judicial institutions.  See generally 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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States are to have republican forms of government falls to Congress under 
current doctrine,218 as does the Tenth Amendment’s federalism limitations on 
Congress’ legislative powers.219  Similarly, primary responsibility for 
implementing Republican Legitimacy falls with the legislative branch.220 
b. Critiquing Professor Charles’ Claim that the Distinction 
Between Rights and Structure is Immaterial 
Let us next consider Professor Charles’ claim that “it is immaterial 
whether one casts political rights claims in a structuralist or individualist 
frame.”221  Charles’ provides two justifications for his conclusion. 
First, Charles argues that “whenever the Court uses rights-speak, the 
Court is doing so instrumentally to mask and rectify structural concerns.”222  Unlike 
rights claims that are grounded in equal protection or free speech, structural 
claims do not have any clear textual basis and for that reason, says Charles, 
have an air of illegitimacy.  Treating structural principles as rights claims 
“provides the patina of constitutional legitimacy – the assurance (or illusion) 
that courts are not simply fashioning doctrine out of whole cloth without 
regard to the constitutional text.”223 
I think there is something self-evidently unsatisfying with Charles’ 
claim that rights claims are a ploy to give textual grounding to judicial 
decisions.  But beyond unsavory duplicity, it is unnecessary.  Some structural 
principles are reasonably inferred from constitutional text.224 Moreover, 
structural inferences are a well-accepted mode of constitutional 
interpretation, as is demonstrated by the well-accepted doctrines of 
“separation of powers” and federalism – both of which are structural 
principles that are derived by inference, not from explicit constitutional text.   
Charles’ second argument is that “structural claims in law and 
politics, which generally stem from democratic theory, are often amorphous 
esoteric ideals that are difficult to domesticate for adjudicative purposes.”225  
                                                 
218See id. 
219 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
220 See Rosen, supra note 21. 
221 Charles, supra note 199, at 1131. 
222 Id. (emphasis supplied). 
223 Id. 
224 For the classic argument, See CHARLES L. BACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND 
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).  For a more recent articulation, 
See Amar, supra note 117, at 28-30 (“For example, the phrases ‘separation of 
powers’ and ‘checks and balances’ appear nowhere in the Constitution, but these 
organizing concepts are part of the document, read holistically. Each of the three 
great departments-- legislative, executive, judicial--is given its own separate article, 
introduced by a separate vesting clause. To read these three vesting clauses as an 
ensemble (as their conspicuously parallel language and parallel placement would 
seem to invite) is to see a plain statement of separated powers.”) 
225 Id. at 1126. 
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Individual rights claims remedy this difficulty, Charles asserts, because  
[a]n individual rights framework is how courts translate 
structural values into adjudicatory claims capable of resolution by 
jurists as opposed to philosophers or policymakers . . . . An 
individual rights framework also helps courts think more concretely 
about structural problems and may direct them toward judicially 
manageable remedies.226 
There are several problems with this argument.  First, the claim that 
“[a]n individual rights framework [ ] helps courts think more concretely 
about structural problems”227 confuses the benefits of case-by-case 
adjudication with individual rights.  It is case-by-case adjudication – not 
individual rights – that has allowed courts to concretely express what various 
individual rights require.  For example, the contents of and values behind the 
individual rights of “free speech” and “equal protection” were initially 
“amorphous” and “esoteric” in the sense that they were difficult to explain,228 
and were only made concrete over time by the Court’s case-by-case, common 
law reasoning.  Conversely, courts have given concrete expression to 
structural values (such as separation of powers) through case-by-case 
adjudication.229    
Second, Charles’ argument fails to explain how the use of individual 
rights “translate[s] structural values” into claims that vindicate those 
structural values.230  Professor Pildes has strenuously argued that it is 
impossible to protect structural values if one begins reasoning from 
individual rights,231 and Charles’ argument does not respond to this.  Part IV 
provides several concrete examples of Pildes’ general claim as it demonstrates 
three reasons why individual rights cannot be relied upon to protect 
structural constitutional values.232   
IV.     REPUBLICAN LEGITIMACY’S EXPLANATORY POWER:  REVISITING 
THREE SUPREME COURT CASES  
Republican Legitimacy reworks the analysis of many controversies 
concerning representative democracy’s rules-of-the-road.  This Part IV 
applies Republican Legitimacy to (1) the voter-identification law that was 
                                                 
226 Id. at 1128. 
227 Charles, supra note 199, at 1128. 
228 See, e.g., LEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION:  FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 4 (1960) (“The meaning of no other 
clause of the Bill of Rights at the time of its framing and ratification has been so 
obscure to us” as the Free Speech and Press Clause). 
229 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
230 Charles, supra note 199, at 1128. 
231 Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1606 
(1999) (“The content of political rights in these cases necessarily derives from a 
judgment about the proper structural aims to attribute to democracy.”). 
232 For a brief overview of these reasons, and cross-references to where the 
arguments are made, see supra note 200. 
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challenged in Crawford, (2) partisan gerrymandering, which was declared a 
non-justiciable political question in Vieth, and (3) the campaign finance 
regulation struck down in Citizens United.  My analysis of Crawford  and Vieth 
demonstrates two reasons why it is crucial to understand Republican 
Legitimacy as a “structural” constitutional principle, rather than assimilating 
it into an individual constitutional right:  (a) individual rights doctrines focus 
attention primarily on individuals, and in so doing can lead courts to 
overlook structural harms, and (b) sub-doctrines developed in the context of 
individual rights may have unintended consequences if applied to structural 
constitutional values.  The analysis of Citizens United shows why Republican 
Legitimacy is superior to “anti-corruption” as a conceptual and doctrinal 
framework, and demonstrates the significance of recognizing that Republican 
Legitimacy is a standalone constitutional principle.  
A.   Crawford and Voter Identification 
Republican Legitimacy alters analysis of the voter identification law 
challenged in Crawford in two fundamental respects.  First, by focusing 
attention on the representative system and not just individuals, Republican 
Legitimacy shows that the plurality opinions overlooked many legally 
relevant facts.  Second, Republican Legitimacy explains why two doctrines 
invoked by the plurality opinions that blocked meaningful judicial review of 
Indiana’s statute – the doctrines of facial challenges and “discriminatory 
intent” – had no proper application in the case.  
1. Overlooked Facts 
In 2005, Indiana enacted one of the nation’s most restrictive voter 
identification laws233 on a straight-line party vote:  it was supported by all 
Republicans in the state legislature and received support from no 
Democrats.234  The law required voters to present government-issued 
identification at the polls.235  Nearly one percent of Indiana’s population  
lacked such identification when the statute was passed,236 most of whom 
were poor or older voters.237  
The Supreme Court in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board238 
upheld a lower court’s dismissal of a challenge to the Indiana statute on a 
rationale that makes it very difficult to challenge voter identification laws 
before elections already have taken place.  The six votes upholding the 
dismissal came in two plurality opinions, one by Justice Stevens (joined by 
the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy), the other by Justice Scalia (and joined 
                                                 
233 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181, 222 (2008) 
(Souter, J., dissenting). 
234 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 203 & n. 21 (providing vote tally); id. at 240 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (noting that Indiana’s law was the most restrictive in the country). 
235 See id. at 185-87. 
236 See id. at 188. 
237 See id. at 238 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
238 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
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by Justices Thomas and Alito).  But the only harm both opinions considered 
was whether the statute violated the “right to vote” under equal protection.239  
Neither the plurality (nor the dissenting opinions)  considered whether the 
statute threatened a structural constitutional harm.  
More specifically, no Justice asked whether the Indiana statute, and 
the circumstances surrounding its enactment, posed a threat to Legitimate-
Selection. If that question had been asked, it would have been obvious that 
numerous facts mentioned in passing were of crucial legal significance.  
Consider the following.  A conservative estimate was that more than forty 
thousand Indiana voters – about 1% of the state’s electorate -- lacked the 
requisite identification at the time the statute was enacted,240 and most of 
these persons tended to vote democratic.  Indiana was understood to be a 
swing state in national elections, and it was well understood that only a few 
hundred voters in another swing state had determined the nation’s President 
only five years earlier.241  The Indiana law combated voter fraud in a highly 
partisan way: the statute targeted a form of fraud (in-person) thought to 
“favor” democrats, and left unaddressed a form of fraud (absentee-voting) 
thought to favor republicans, despite the fact that the only fraud that had 
been documented in Indiana was absentee-voting.242  Finally, all Republicans 
in both houses of the Indiana legislature had supported the law, and all 
Democrats opposed it.  Indeed, Justice Stevens’ plurality opinion – which 
rejected the lawsuit -- went so far as to observe that “[i]t is fair to infer that 
partisan considerations may have played a significant role in the decision to 
enact” Indiana’s law.243  The three dissenting Justices agreed.244    
None of the abovementioned facts evidencing partisanship, however, 
was legally relevant under Justices Stevens’ and Scalia’s opinions.  This is not 
surprising.  Legal tests are reductive, identifying as legally relevant only a 
small subset of the infinite facts that characterize a given circumstance. The 
abovementioned facts bear on the question of whether there has been 
structural harm to republican government, but do not readily fit into equal 
protection doctrine, which focuses instead on harm to individual voters.  
Thus Justice Stevens’ analysis was directed almost exclusively at considering 
the “voters who may experience a special burden under the statute,” 
ultimately rejecting petitioner’s challenge because the record did not show 
“excessively burdensome requirements on any class of voters.”245  Likewise, 
                                                 
239 Id. at 1621 (Stevens, J.,); id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
240 Id. at 218 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
241 I refer, of course, to Florida in the 2000 presidential election. 
242 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 195; id. at 225 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
243 Id. at 1624. 
244 See id. at 236 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that Indiana had enacted “one of 
the most restrictive photo identification requirements in the country . . . [w]ithout a 
shred of evidence that in-person voter impersonation is a problem in the State, 
much less a crisis”). 
245 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200-203.  The facts evidencing partisanship conceivably 
could have been relevant to another part of Justice Stevens’ equal protection 
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Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion focused exclusively on the law’s effects on 
voters.246   
But from the vantage point of the structural principle of Republican 
Legitimacy, the above facts evidencing partisanship were crucially relevant.  
A known byproduct of stricter registration requirements is that fewer people 
to whom the requirements apply will vote.  Republicans thought that the 
law’s additional requirements would keep more Democrat-voting than 
Republican-voting voters from voting.  And so did Democrats.  A 
purposeful partisan-skewed reduction of the electorate violates the first 
component of political legitimacy, Legitimate-Selection.  That Indiana’s voter 
identification law also aimed to accomplish a legitimate anti-fraud goal should 
not provide cover for a legislature to differentially limit the electorate.247  
To conclude, exclusive reliance on individual rights doctrines led the 
parties and Court to overlook the legal significance of many facts concerning 
the legitimacy of Indiana’s electoral system.  And this allows us to generalize 
an additional reason why Professor Charles is mistaken in claiming it does 
not matter whether a constitutional interest is denominated as individual or 
structural:248  Legal rules are reductive by nature, and individual rights 
doctrines focus attention on individuals, not structure.  Individual rights 
claim accordingly may allow structural harms to be neglected.   
2. Inapplicable Sub-doctrines 
Each plurality opinion in Crawford invoked a legal sub-doctrine that 
kept each plurality from applying heightened review.  Republican Legitimacy 
                                                                                                                         
analysis, the requirement that the Indiana law be “nondiscriminatory.” See id. at 204.  
But Justice Stevens did not think the aforementioned partisanship facts relevant to 
the nondiscrimination inquiry, likely because he used discriminatory in the oddly 
narrow sense of meaning an “irrelevant” voting requirement.  See id. at 189 
(concluding that the poll taxes struck down in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663 (1996), “invidiously discriminate[d]” because the taxes were “irrelevant 
to the voter’s qualifications.”).  There is one other place in Justice Stevens’ plurality 
where the abovementioned facts conceivably could have been relevant.  See infra 
note 247. 
246 See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204-09 (Scalia, J., plur. op) (discussing what criteria 
determine “the severity of the burden” that a law imposes on voters). 
247 Justice Stevens suggests Indiana’s law would have been unconstitutional if 
“partisan considerations . . . had provided the only justification” for it. Id. at 203 
(emphasis supplied). This is too cramped an understanding of the appropriate 
constitutional limitations. On Justice Stevens’ view, all voter identification laws 
would pass muster under a facial challenge because all aim to accomplish at least 
one legitimate goal -- combating voter fraud. This short-changes Legitimate-
Selection, for the reasons provided above in text.  That there are legitimate policies 
behind a genus of election laws should not mean that all possible species of the 
election law are constitutional. I explain in a companion article what the Court 
should have done in Crawford.  See Rosen, supra note 21, at 46 and ff. 
248 See supra Part II.D.2. 
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makes clear why neither sub-doctrine properly shielded Indiana’s  law from 
careful scrutiny.  Both doctrines properly apply to rights-based claims, but 
were inapposite to the structural principle of Republican Legitimacy.  
 a.     The Overlooked As-Applied Challenge   
Justice Stevens’ opinion assumed that the petitioners bore “a heavy 
burden of persuasion” because they advanced a facial challenge.249  The 
Court has explicitly stated that “[f]acial challenges are disfavored,”250 and it 
has deliberately designed the doctrine so that facial challenges are much more 
difficult to win than as-applied challenges.  Facial challenges will prevail only 
if a “law is unconstitutional in all its applications,” and “a facial challenge 
must fail where the statute has a plainly legitimate sweep.”251     
Justice Stevens was surely correct that petitioners’ equal protection 
claims were facial challenges.  After all, the election had not yet occurred, and 
so no Indiana voters had yet been kept from voting. “[C]onsider[ing] only the 
statute’s broad application to all Indiana voters,” Justice Stevens quickly 
concluded that the State’s interests in countering fraud were “sufficient to 
defeat petitioners’ facial challenge . . .”252  
But exclusive focus on a rights claim led the Court and parties to 
overlook the as-applied challenge that also was present.  Though an 
individual may not be harmed until she has been barred from voting, 
structural harm to the legitimacy of republican government can arise before 
election day.  Voter registration laws bear on the structural principle of 
Legitimate-Selection, and such laws can affect the political activities of 
people and organizations before elections take place.  Because laws that 
undermine Legitimate-Selection can have effects before elections, as-applied 
Republican Legitimacy challenges should be able to be brought before election 
day.  Laws that allegedly seek to differentially disenfranchise on partisan 
grounds undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process before even a 
single elector has been wrongfully kept from voting, and hence can properly 
be subject to as-applied Republican Legitimacy challenges prior to election 
day.    
This is important because, as explained above, facial challenges are 
exceedingly difficult to win.253  Post-election lawsuits asserting as-applied 
rights claims are not adequate to protect the structural interest of Republican 
Legitimacy because judicial remedies are limited.  For example, courts have 
only limited institutional capital to cast aside election results and order new 
elections.254  Further, because legislatures make frequent modifications to 
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their election laws, allowing only as-applied rights claims effectively insulates 
these laws from serious judicial review.   
We now are in a position to appreciate another reason why Professor 
Charles is mistaken in arguing that it is irrelevant whether constitutional 
interests are denominated as individual or structural:255  Rights-based claims 
can trigger sub-doctrines that are not applicable to structural claims.   (The 
next subsection gives a second example of this). 
b. The Irrelevance of Discriminatory Intent 
Republican Legitimacy explains why the doctrinal obstacle to strict 
judicial review identified in Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion – the absence of 
a showing of intentional discrimination by the Indiana legislature – should 
not have barred the Court from subjecting Indiana’s statute to heightened 
scrutiny.  
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, which was joined by Justices 
Thomas and Alito, cited to Washington v. Davis256 and asserted that petitioners’ 
claim failed because they could not show that the Indiana legislature had a 
discriminatory intent: 
[W]eighing the burden of a nondiscriminatory voting law upon 
each voter and concomitantly requiring exceptions for vulnerable 
voters would effectively turn back decades of equal –protection 
jurisprudence.  A voter complaining about such a law’s effect on 
him has no valid equal-protection claim because, without proof of 
discriminatory intent, a generally applicable law with disparate 
impact is not unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment does 
not regard neutral laws as invidious ones, even when their burdens 
purportedly fall disproportionately on a protected class.  A fortiori it 
does not do so when, as here, the classes complaining of disparate 
impact are not even protected.257 
A discriminatory intent may be sensible vis-à-vis individual rights, but 
it has no place vis-à-vis structural constitutional principles. An equal 
protection doctrine without a discriminatory impact requirement may subject 
too many legitimate laws to heightened scrutiny, thereby striking down too 
many laws, as a result of what might be called ‘judicial myopia.’  There are 
political losers in virtually every legislative battle, and this fact of politics 
ordinarily is not constitutionally problematic.  Without a discriminatory 
intent requirement, such “non-problematic” political losers can get courts to 
focus on their loss -- without giving adequate attention to the statute’s overall 
benefits which, as almost always occurs in politics, comes at the expense of 
someone -- and to subject the legislation to a heightened scrutiny that seldom 
                                                                                                                         
LAW OF DEMOCRACY:  LEGAL STRUCTURES OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 967 (3rd 
ed. 2007)(noting that the “drastic remedy” of setting aside elections is “quite rare”). 
255 See supra Part II.D.2. 
256 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). 
257 128 S. Ct. at 1626 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
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can be satisfied when “mere politics” is the real reason for their loss.  A 
discriminatory intent requirement is a plausible doctrinal mechanism for 
correcting such “judicial myopia.” 
Critically, the risk of judicial myopia does not extend to structural 
constitutional principles.  If a statute imposes a structural constitutional 
harm, that is a sufficient and legitimate basis for triggering heightened judicial 
review because  there is no larger context that conceivably could justify the 
legislation.  Accordingly, a structural harm appropriately triggers heightened 
judicial scrutiny.  And this explains why structural constitutional principles do 
not contain discriminatory intent requirements.  For instance, separation of 
powers doctrine considers the aggregate effects of a statute on (let’s say) the 
President’s powers, never inquiring whether Congress intended to encroach on 
presidential power.258  This is true of both (so-called) formalist and 
functionalist separation-of-powers doctrines.259 The Court’s federalism 
jurisprudence likewise did not include an intentionality requirement in the 
days when it judicially enforced the Tenth Amendment.260  Nor is there any 
such intentionality requirement under the Court’s quasi-Tenth Amendment  
anti-commandeering jurisprudence.261 
That discriminatory intent has no proper application to structural 
constitutional principles is yet another reason why individual rights doctrines 
cannot adequately guard structural values.262  Discriminatory intent is 
exceedingly difficult to establish.  Beyond the “many minds” puzzle of which 
legislators’ intent should matter for purposes of establishing discriminatory 
intent, legislators tend to have multiple motivations when they vote, and 
nowadays are sufficiently sophisticated to avoid publicly revealing nefarious 
intents.  Further, state legislatures – the institutions that create most of the 
rules-of-the-road -- typically do not publish formal legislative histories that 
reveal any legislative intent.  For all these reasons, discriminatory intent is 
hard to show, and doctrines that require it risk under-enforcing the 
constitutional principle they implement.263   
As applied to the Indiana law, the upshot is the following:  showing 
that the Indiana legislature discriminatorily intended to undermine the 
legitimacy of the electoral process was not a prerequisite of heightened 
                                                 
258 See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (legal test is whether allowing 
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scrutiny.264  Reliance on individual rights left the structural constitutional 
interest vulnerable because discriminatory requirements, which are very 
difficult to satisfy, are not applicable to structural constitutional claims. 
B. Vieth and Political Gerrymandering 
Five Justices dismissed a political gerrymandering claim as non-
justiciable in Vieth v. Jubelirer.265  Joined by three other Justices, Justice Scalia’s 
plurality opinion decided that all political gerrymandering claims were non-
justiciable political questions because there was no judicially manageable 
standard.  In his view, “the mere fact that the[] four dissenters come up with 
three different standards – all of them different from the two proposed by 
[the earlier case of] Bandemer and the one proposed here by appellants – goes 
a long way to establishing that there is no constitutionally discernible 
standard.”266  Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which provided the crucial fifth 
vote, dismissed the claim but did not categorically shut the door on political 
gerrymandering claims.267  
Republican Legitimacy sheds important light on Vieth in two  
respects.  First, it provides a conceptual framework that faciliates 
identification of overlooked common ground between Justice Kennedy and 
the four dissenters.  The conceptual and doctrinal clarity provided by 
Republican Legitimacy conceivably could have led to a different outcome in 
Vieth: a five Justice opinion permitting Republican Legitimacy claims against 
partisan gerrymanders.268     
Second, awareness of Republican Legitimacy facilitates recognition of 
the inadequacies of the individual-rights based approach taken in Vieth.  The 
multiple proposed legal tests do not mean there are no “discernible 
standards” to govern political gerrymandering claims as Justice Scalia 
claimed, but reflect the folly of shoehorning challenges to political 
gerrymandering into an individual rights-claim instead of placing them into 
the structural constitutional claim in which they properly fit.  Republican 
Legitimacy hence shows that Justice Scalia mistook a failure to agree on 
account of conceptual confusion for the impossibility of agreement. 
1. Overlooked Common Ground 
The sole constitutional ground asserted by the petitioners before the 
Supreme Court was that Pennsylvania’s redistricting plan violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.269  This exclusively individual-rights focused approach 
                                                 
264 A companion article considers precisely what scrutiny should have been 
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distorted the way the Justices viewed the case because it left the Justices 
without a doctrinal and conceptual basis to ground the structural harms that 
five of the Justices had noted.  Consequently, some Justices merely made 
passing comments about partisan gerrymandering’s structural harms, while 
others attempted to shoehorn the structural harms (which in fact are aspects 
of Republican Legitimacy) into individual rights doctrine.  Republican 
Legitimacy provides a coherent framework within which these harms could 
have been housed.  
First consider Justice Stevens’ dissent.  He thought partisan 
gerrymandering ran afoul of Equal Protection, but his conception of the 
constitutional harm was structural, not rights-based.  Gerrymanders “effect a 
constitutional wrong when they disrupt the representational norms that 
ordinarily tether elected officials to their constituencies as a whole.”270  They 
generate a “disruption of the representative process,” which imposes a 
“representational harm.”271  Justice Stevens is describing harms to both 
components of Republican Legitimacy:  gerrymanders distort Legitimate-
Selection and undermine Legitimate-Decisionmaking.   
To be sure, Justice Stevens labored to tie these structural harms to 
individuals so as to fit them into Equal Protection doctrine.272  This is 
conceptually misbegotten insofar as it focuses attention away from the 
primary harm and instead onto its secondary consequences.  And doing this 
had significant doctrinal costs because, as shown above, sub-doctrines 
applicable to individual rights-based doctrines frequently are irrelevant to 
structural principles.273  More specifically, Justice Stevens’ individual rights 
analysis triggered an equal protection sub-doctrine that shielded the claim 
from heightened judicial review, as Justice Scalia convincingly showed.274 
That sub-doctrine would have had no application, however, to a structural 
constitutional claim grounded in Republican Legitimacy.275   
Even more clearly than Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
conceptualized the harm of partisan gerrymandering structurally.  
Unconstitutional gerrymandering occurs when the district-drawing “fail[s] to 
advance any plausible democratic objective while simultaneously threatening 
serious democratic harm.”276  Breyer found “constitutionally mandated 
                                                                                                                         
present case”) (Scalia, J., plurality op.).  
270 Id. at 329 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied). 
271 Id. at 330 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
272 See id. at 323-33. 
273 See supra Part IV.A.2. 
274Justice Stevens analogized political gerrymandering to racial gerrymandering.  
As Justice Scalia pointed out, however, the level of scrutiny under Equal Protection 
turns on the identity of the harmed group, and while race triggers heightened 
scrutiny, political affiliation does not.  See id. at 293-94 (plurality op).   
275 The level of review appropriate to a structural claim does not turn on whether 
there has been harm to individuals who fall into a suspect class for equal protection 
purposes.  See Rosen, supra note 21. 
276 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting)(emphasis supplied). 
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democratic requirements”277 to be grounded in the Constitution’s opening 
words.278  The contents of these constitutional “democratic requirements” 
are part of Legitimate-Selection:  prohibited is “the unjustified use of political 
factors to entrench a minority in power.”279  Entrenchment is a “democratic 
harm” that “dishonor[s] . . . democratic values” because “voters find it far 
more difficult to remove those responsible for a government they do not 
want.”280   
To be sure, Justice Breyer ultimately grounded the constitutional 
harm of partisan gerrymandering in equal protection.281  This is unsurprising 
in view of the fact that equal protection was the only claim petitioners had 
asserted.  But Breyer’s structural conception of gerrymandering’s harm 
suggests he may have been amenable to the principle of Republican 
Legitimacy. 
Justice Kennedy, whose concurrence provided the critical fifth vote 
for Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, plausibly could have provided an 
additional vote for Republican Legitimacy.  Justice Kennedy criticized  the 
appellants’ exclusive reliance on equal protection and suggested that an 
alternative constitutional principle – free speech -- may have been more 
suitable to their challenge.282  Openness to an alternative to equal protection 
suggests Kennedy might have been open to other grounds as well.   
Further, Justice Kennedy wrote of gerrymandering’s impact on 
“rights of fair and effective representation.”283  Kennedy also explicitly 
framed the free speech challenge he proposed in structural terms, tying his 
proposed legal test to the structural rationale that “[r]epresentative 
democracy in any populous unit of governance is unimaginable without the 
ability of citizens to band together in promoting among the electorate 
candidates who espouse their political views.”284  Finally, and most tellingly, 
Justice Kennedy closed his concurrence as follows:   
The ordered working of our Republic, and of the democratic process, 
depends on a sense of decorum and restraint in all branches of 
government . . . Here, one has the sense that legislative restraint was 
abandoned.  That should not be thought to serve the interests of our 
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political order.285     
This likely is Justice Kennedy’s view as to what was the most salient harm, 
and it is structural in character:  trauma to the conditions necessary to sustain 
the “ordered working of our Republic,” the “democratic process,” and “our 
political order.”286  And these are part of Legitimate-Selection. 
Justice Kennedy ultimately concurred because of the “failings of the 
many proposed standards for measuring the burden a gerrymander imposes 
on representation rights,”287 but thought the Court “should be prepared to 
order relief” if workable standards emerge in the future.288 Might he have 
joined an opinion that asked a lower court to take account of the structural 
harms that he himself observed?  The fairest answer, I would think, is an 
enthusiastic “perhaps.”  The answer quite likely turns on whether such a 
harm could be protected by a judicially manageable legal standard.  A 
companion Article argues that it can.289  
 Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion (joined by Justice Ginsburg) made 
passing reference to gerrymandering’s structural consequences, noting that 
“the increasing efficiency of partisan redistricting has damaged the 
democratic process to a degree that our predecessors only began to 
imagine.”290  The thrust of Justice Souter’s opinion, however, was that 
gerrymandering harmed individual voters.291  But this does not mean that 
Justices Souter and Ginsburg would have been unwilling to join an opinion 
that forthrightly understood partisan gerrymandering as (also) imposing a 
structural constitutional harm.  Is it farfetched to suggest they may have 
joined an opinion signed by Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Kennedy that 
analyzed partisan gerrymandering under the structural principle of 
Republican Legitimacy? 
2. Mistaking a Failure to Agree for the Impossibility of 
Agreement 
 Republican Legitimacy facilitates recognition of a flaw in Justice 
Scalia’s main argument.  Scalia wrote “the mere fact that these four dissenters 
come up with three different standards . . . goes a long way to establishing 
                                                 
285 Id. at 316-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis supplied). 
286 Id. 
287 Id. at 317. 
288 Id. 
289 See Rosen, Implementing Republican Legitimacy, supra note 21. 
290 Id. at 345 (Souter, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 343 (gerrymandering interferes with 
the “right to ‘fair and effective representation’”) (internal quotation omitted) 
(Souter, J., dissenting). 
291 See id. at 343 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution guarantees both 
formal and substantial equality among voters”) (emphasis supplied); (describing 
gerrymandering as denying “each political group in a State [of] the same chance to 
elect representatives of its choice as any other political group”). 
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that there is no constitutionally discernible standard.”292  This is an unfair 
conclusion because although all dissenters invoked the same terminology of 
“equal protection,” they had fundamentally different understandings of 
partisan gerrymandering’s harm.  Justices Stevens and Breyer conceptualized 
the harm structurally, whereas Justices Souter and Ginsburg conceptualized 
individual-based harms.  The Justices’ different judicial standards are a 
natural byproduct of their different conceptions of the constitutional harm, 
but do not indicate that a single conception could not be addressed by a 
manageable standard. It is possible that the conceptual clarity afforded by 
Republican Legitimacy could have led to agreement among the Justices.  The 
Justices’ lack of conceptual clarity in Vieth does not mean that agreement is 
impossible once clarity is obtained, pace Justice Scalia.   
C.     Revisiting Citizens United 
Republican Legitimacy has important implications for Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commission,293 the controversial decision striking down the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002’s (the “BCRA”) prohibition on 
corporations and unions from using general treasury funds to make 
independent expenditures for “electioneering communication” or the express 
advocacy of the election or defeat of a candidate.294 Republican Legitimacy 
illuminates Citizens United in two respects.  First, as Part IV.C.1 explains, 
Republican Legitimacy clarifies the nature and significance of the 
governmental interest behind the expenditures prohibition, showing there 
was a compelling governmental interest.  Second, Republican Legitimacy 
shows that deciding whether corporate and union expenditures should be 
banned implicated a conflict between two competing constitutional 
considerations:  free speech and Republican Legitimacy.  Congress’ 
considered resolution of this constitutional conflict was entitled to substantial 
judicial deference.  
1. Recognizing a Compelling Governmental Interest 
First, Republican Legitimacy clarifies the governmental interest 
behind the campaign finance regulation.  This is doctrinally critical  because 
all Justices accepted that constitutionally protected speech can be regulated 
when there is a compelling governmental interest and the regulation is 
narrowly tailored.295  Among the core disputes in the case was whether the 
BCRA’s provision was supported by a compelling governmental interest.   
The Justices believed that the crucial question was whether BCRA’s 
ban was designed to prevent “corruption,” or the appearance thereof, of the 
electoral process. “Corruption” assumed this central role because the earlier 
case of  Buckley v. Valeo  held that preventing corruption or its appearance 
                                                 
292 Id. at 292. 
293 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
294 See id. at 887. 
295 See id. at 898.   
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was “sufficiently important” to justify campaign finance limits.296  Of course, 
the fact that corruption was sufficiently important does not mean that only 
corruption is sufficiently important to justify regulation.  But instead of 
considering whether there were other sufficiently important governmental 
interests, the lawyers defending BCRA and the Justices tried to shoehorn all 
governmental interests into the one surefire sufficiently important interest, 
corruption.  This was unfortunate because, as I explain below, Republican 
Legitimacy is a far superior framework for analyzing the BCRA.  
a.  The Justices’ Understandings of Corruption  
To recognize Republican Legitimacy’s superiority to corruption, it 
first is necessary to understand how ‘corruption’ operated in the Citizens 
United opinions.  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion held that corruption 
extended only to “quid pro quo corruption,” i.e., the direct exchange of 
“dollars for political favors.”297  The majority concluded that “independent 
expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to 
corruption or the appearance of corruption,”298 and that BCRA’s ban 
accordingly did not satisfy strict scrutiny.   
Justice Stevens’ dissent adopted a broader definition of corruption. 
Drawing on prior cases, Justice Stevens identified nearly a half dozen ways  
that union and corporate expenditures could lead to “corruption:” 
unregulated expenditures could (1) give corporations “unfair influence in the 
electoral process;” (2)   “distort public debate in ways that undermine rather 
than advance the interests of listeners . . . [by] drowning out [] non-corporate 
voices;” (3)   “generate the impression that corporations dominate our 
democracy,” which could lead citizens to “lose faith in their capacity, as 
citizens, to influence public policy,” to “cynicism and disenchantment,” and 
ultimately to “a reduced ‘willingness of voters to take part in democratic 
governance;” (4)     possibly “chill the speech” of elected officials, “who fear 
that a certain corporation can make or break their reelection chances;”  and 
(5) “open the door to ‘rent seeking that is far more destructive’ than what 
noncorporations are capable of” due to corporation’ lower collective action 
costs vis-à-vis individuals.299   
b.     The Superiority of “Republican Legitimacy”  
Republican Legitimacy is a superior framework to “anti-corruption” 
for four reasons.  First, Republican Legitimacy provides a more conceptually 
coherent framework that explains how the welter of policies discussed in 
Justice Stevens’ dissent were all parts of a single integrated principle.  Second,  
Republican Legitimacy points to other lines of caselaw that supported the 
                                                 
296 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976). 
297 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909-10. 
298 Id. at 909. 
299 Id. at 974-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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dissent’s position.  Third,  the understanding that BCRA’s  goal was to secure 
Republican Legitimacy, rather than to address corruption, sheds a spotlight 
on two extraordinary logical gaps in the majority’s reasoning. Finally, 
Republican Legitimacy provides a principled basis for concluding that the 
BCRA was supported by a compelling governmental interest.  
i.     Conceptual Clarity 
Consider first the many forms of “corruption” Justice Stevens 
identifies in his dissent.  As presented in his opinion, they can seem like a 
disjointed laundry-list.  Indeed, it is not without cause that Professor Hasen 
has written that although Stevens’ analysis contains “many provocative and 
important ideas,” it “as a whole . . . does not cohere.”300    
 While Stevens’ arguments may not “cohere” under an anti-corruption 
rationale,301 this does not mean that they cannot cohere.  The coherence 
problem lies not with Stevens’  justifications, but with the organizing rubric 
of anti-corruption. Republican Legitimacy, by contrast, perfectly captures the 
potential harms Stevens identified.  The apparently disparate list of dangers  
fall into two categories that by now should be familiar:  threats to (1) 
Legitimate-Selection (rationales 1-3) and (2) Legitimate-Decisionmaking 
(rationales 4-5).   
 To see that Justice Stevens was speaking more about Republican 
Legitimacy than corruption, consider his response to Justice Kennedy’s 
argument that corruption extends only to quid-pro-quo exchanges. Justice 
Stevens wrote that “[t]here are threats of corruption that are far more 
destructive to a democratic society than the odd bribe.”302  Stevens’ 
explanation is more naturally and compellingly conceptualized as addressing 
the governmental interest in guarding Republican Legitimacy.  Stevens spoke 
of the danger that “private interests are seen to exert outsized control over 
officeholders solely on account of the money spent on (or withheld from) 
their campaigns . . .”303  Instead, officeholders must “decide issues . . . on the 
merits or the desires of their constituencies, . . . not according to the wishes 
of those who have made large financial contributions – or expenditures – 
valued by the officeholder.”304  Justice Stevens called this the concern that 
some non-constituents will have an “undue influence,” or “improper 
influence,[]” on officeholders’ decisionmaking.305 Furthermore, he wrote,   
                                                 
300 Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989, 999 (2011). 
301 While Professor Hasen argued that Justice Stevens’ explanations did not 
amount to a coherent anti-distortion rationale, Justice Stevens himself equated anti-
corruption with antidistortion, See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 970-71 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
302 Id. at 962-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
303 Id. 
304 Id. (quoting from McConnell, 540 U.S. at 153). 
305 Id. at 962-63 & nn. 63-65.  
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[t]here should be nothing controversial about the proposition that 
the influence being targeted is ‘undue.’  In a democracy, 
officeholders should not make public decisions with the aim of 
placating a financial benefactor, except to the extent that the 
benefactor is seen as representative of a larger constituency or its 
arguments are seen as especially persuasive.306   
In short, though Justice Stevens used the terminology of “corruption,” he 
actually was drawing on a theory of what constitutes illegitimate 
decisionmaking by elected representatives, i.e., Legitimate-Decisionmaking.307 
 Framing Justice Stevens’ argument as the claim that  BCRA aimed to 
secure Legitimate-Decisionmaking significantly strengthens the argument.  In 
addition to revealing the conceptual unity behind what at first appears to be 
disparate policies, Republican Legitimacy provides a principled reason to 
conclude that BCRA was supported by a compelling governmental interest.  
BCRA targeted what Congress believed to be improper influences on 
legislators’ decisionmaking: Congress thought corporate and union 
expenditures posed a particularly acute risk that legislators would support 
policies for reasons of illegitimate self-interest. Because maintaining 
Republican Legitimacy constitutes a constitutional interest, governmental 
policies that target threats to Republican Legitimacy satisfy the compelling 
governmental interest test.308 
 Further, grounding Stevens’ argument in Republican Legitimacy 
invokes the case law and theoretical considerations examined earlier that 
explain the need for, and contents of, Legitimate-Decisionmaking.309  
Government officials must act impartially in the public interest, and “self-
interested behavior by government officials”310 can be unconstitutional 
without rising to the level of “corrupt.”  Consider in this regard the “conflict-
of-interest recusal rule[s]” in Congress and “virtually every State” that were 
canvassed (and upheld) in Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan.311  The 
criteria for recusal – when a legislator “is immediately and particularly 
                                                 
306 Id. at n. 63. 
307 Consider, as well, Justice Stevens’ executive summary of the BCRA’s goal:  to 
“safeguard the integrity, competitiveness, and democratic responsiveness of the 
electoral process.” Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 974-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  This 
is conceptually connected to Republican Legitimacy, not to anti-corruption.   
308 The analysis above in text does not mean that all expenditure restrictions 
would be constitutional.  Regulations still would have to satisfy the narrowly tailored 
standard, meaning that restrictions that selectively disadvantaged a political party or 
ideology would be unconstitutional.   
309 See supra Part II.B.2. 
310See VERMEULE, supra note 49, at 4-5. 
311 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2348-49 (2011).  Though Carrigan was decided after Citizens 
United, legislative anti-recusal rules date back to a week after the First Congress 
convened, See id. at 2348.  “[T]he long-recognized need for legislative recusal” is 
itself powerful evidence of the need’s legitimacy.  Id. at 2347-48.  And as explained 
above in text, the need for such recusal rules is grounded in Legitimacy-
Decisionmaking. 
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interested or a judge has “personal bias or prejudice” – are triggered by 
circumstances that fall short of “corruption.” This is so because the recusal 
criteria are not aimed at corruption, but at maintaining the legitimacy and 
dignity of government.312   
In short, like the recusal rules at issue in Carrigan, BCRA was an 
instance of the legislature policing itself.  The Carrigan Court was substantially 
deferential to legislative self-policing,313 even when it trenched on legislators’ 
political advocacy; the Carrigan majority upheld not only Nevada’s voting 
ban, but also rules that “forbid [the legislator] to ‘advocate the passage or 
failure’ of the proposal – evidently meaning advocating its passage or failure 
during the legislative debate.”314  The Citizens United Court likewise should 
have been more deferential to Congress’ self-policing in BCRA.   
 ii.   Gaps in the Majority’s Logic 
 Republican Legitimacy sheds light on a logical flaw in Justice 
Kennedy’s decision for the majority.  Consider Justice Kennedy’s argument 
as to why preventing quid-pro-exchanges of “dollars for political favors” is 
the only anti-corruption interest that constitutes a compelling governmental 
interest.315  Kennedy stated that even though corporate and union 
expenditures may be intended by their donors to secure influence over 
legislators, “favoritism and influence are not avoidable in representative 
politics.”316  Not only can they not be avoided, but they are desirable in 
Kennedy’s view: 
It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain 
policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and 
contributors who support those policies.  It is well understood that 
a substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a 
vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another 
is that the candidate will respond by producing those political 
outcomes the supporter favors.  Democracy is premised on 
responsiveness. 
                                                 
312 The Senate’s recusal rules, adopted when Thomas Jefferson was President of 
the Senate, explain that not having such rules would be “so contrary not only to the 
laws of decency, but to the fundamental principles of the social compact, which 
denies to any man to be a judge in his own case,” and goes on to say that “it is for 
the honor of the house that this rule, of immemorial observance, should be strictly 
adhered to.” Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2348, quoting PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, supra 
note 164, at 31. 
313 To be sure, under the Carrigan majority’s analysis, the Court was not being 
deferential to legislative self-policing because the recusal rules did not affect 
constitutionally protected speech.  I criticized this reasoning, and explained above 
why the recusal statutes indeed regulated constitutionally protected speech, but did 
so in a permissible fashion.  See supra note 167.   
314Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2347. 
315 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909-10. 
316 Id. 
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In short, “favoritism and influence” are the other side of the coin of 
representatives’ responsiveness to constituents’ preferences -- and 
responsiveness is a normative good in a representative democracy. 
When examined through the lens of “anti-corruption,” Justice 
Kennedy’s position may seem plausible.  After all, do the activities listed in 
Justice Stevens’ dissent really constitute corruption?  Is it corrupt for 
corporations to aim to influence who gets elected and how their 
representatives vote, and if corporations can spend more money than 
individuals to influence elections?  Is it corrupt for a legislator to be 
influenced by the donations of his contributors?  Given the amorphousness 
of  corruption, and its usual requirement of bad intent,317 there is plausibility 
to Justice Kennedy’s conclusion that these phenomena do not constitute 
“corruption.”  
Kennedy’s argument looks very different, however, through the lens 
of Republican Legitimacy.  As explained above, Justice Stevens’ position is 
best understood as the claim that BCRA guarded Legitimate-Decisionmking.  
Thusly understood, Justice Kennedy’s argument was a non-sequitur.318  Justice 
Kennedy’s truism – that at an officeholder invariably favors one policy (and 
hence voter preference) over another policy (and voter preference)  – is 
irrelevant to whether a class of illegitimate legislative motivations exists. 
Similarly, that representatives should be responsive to their constituents’ 
preferences does not mean that there does not exist a category of 
“illegitimate” or “undue” constituent influence, as Justice Stevens claimed.  
For these reasons, Justice Kennedy’s position does not respond at all to the 
best understanding of Justice Stevens’ argument. 
2. Recognizing a Constitutional Conflict    
Republican Legitimacy could have had another important implication 
for the BCRA.  Republican Legitimacy makes clear that the BCRA implicated 
two competing constitutional principles:   speech and Republican 
Legitimacy.319  Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority did not analyze 
BCRA this way:  it viewed BCRA as an inexplicable disregard of one  
constitutional commitment (speech),320 not as a resolution of a difficult 
                                                 
317 See Teachout, supra note 9, at 382 (arguing that bad intent is the “centerpiece” 
of political corruption). 
318 While the idea of illegitimate legislative motivations may be missed under a 
“corruption” rubric, this idea stands front-and-center of Republican Legitimacy’s 
concern with Legitimate-Decisionmaking. 
319 While BCRA admittedly limited speech, it also advanced Republican 
Legitimacy.  Striking the ban arguably came at the expense of the constitutional 
value of Republican Legitimacy.   
320 See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 898 (“political speech must prevail against 
laws that would suppress it”). Though Justice Stevens at one point referred to the 
necessity of “balanc[ing] competing constitutional concerns,” id. at 969 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting), he was referring to the competing First Amendment interests of the 
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constitutional conflict.  Of course Congress hadn’t actually realized this since 
it had not recognized  Republican Legitimacy to be a constitutional principle.  
But if Congress had – if the BCRA were the considered judgments of 
Congress and the President as to how competing constitutional principles 
should be harmonized – then their judgment should have received significant 
judicial deference.321   
There are two reasons such deference would have been appropriate.  
First, there is no objective way to reconcile competing incommensurable 
constitutional commitments.322  Greater weight must be given to one, and 
deciding the extent to which one prevails over the other is an unavoidably 
subjective judgment.323 The political branches are better suited than courts to 
harmonizing incommensurable constitutional commitments on basic 
democratic grounds due to harmonization’s inescapable subjectivity.324  In 
                                                                                                                         
speaker (corporations and unions) and the public, not to conflicts among distinct 
constitutional principles.  See id. 
321 Courts and scholars have given surprisingly little attention to conflicts 
between constitutional principles.  Justice Breyer has come closest.  When analyzing 
a campaign finance limitation in one pre-Citizens United case, Breyer proposed a 
deferential standard of review “where constitutionally protected interests lie on both 
sides of the legal equation.”  Nixon, 528 U.S. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(emphasis supplied).  But the “competing constitutionally protected interests” of which 
Breyer spoke, id. at 402 (emphasis supplied), is not the same as two competing 
constitutional principles.  Indeed, the cases he cited concerned non-constitutional 
governmental interests sufficiently important to justify the regulation of speech, see 
id. (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988), which held that a person’s 
“well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home” is a “significant government 
interest”) and circumstances where two parties had competing speech interests, see 
Nixon, 528 U.S. at 403 (citing numerous such cases).   
     Two recent books, which focus primarily on human rights law and the 
European Court of Human Rights, address the related issue of how conflicting rights 
should be adjudicated.  See GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, PHILOSOPHER KINGS?  THE 
ADJUDICATION OF CONFLICTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL VALUES (2011); 
LORENZO ZUCCA, CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMAS (2007).  Though BCRA concerns 
the different issue of a conflict between a constitutional right and a structural 
constitutional principle, many of Professor Christie’s ideas are nevertheless 
applicable.  A work-in-progress of mine provides a comprehensive treatment to 
conflicts among constitutional principles. 
322 That is to say, the two principles cannot be reduced to a common metric that 
would then allow for an objectively correct decision to harmonize the conflict by 
choosing the principle with the highest value. See generally CHRISTIE, supra note 
321, at 168 (providing a clear discussion of the incommensurability of constitutional 
values).  In theory, the statement above in text is not true for an originalist if 
originalist sources considered and definitively resolved the conflict.  In practice, 
originalist sources seldom if ever do so.   
323 See, e.g., CHRISTIE, supra note 321, at 167 (concluding that when human 
rights conflict, judges “are in fact choosing between values”).   
324 See Mark D. Rosen, Why The Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?) 
Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors That 
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fact, the same reasons that democracies place primary responsibility in 
legislatures to harmonize  incommensurable non-constitutional public policies 
suggest that legislatures also should be primarily responsible for reconciling 
competing constitutional commitments.   
Second, legislatures frequently have greater institutional expertise 
than courts in ferreting out and understanding the empirical judgments that 
are relevant to reconciling competing constitutional principles.  This 
unquestionably is the case with election regulation. Justice Breyer is right that 
“the legislature understands the problem – the threat to electoral integrity, 
the need for democratization – better than [courts] do” and that the court 
accordingly should “defer to [Congress’] political judgment that unlimited 
spending threatens the integrity of the electoral process.”325  So was Justice 
White’s dissent in Buckley, where he observed that “Congress was plainly of 
the view that these expenditures also have corruptive potential; but the Court 
strikes down the provision, strangely enough claiming more insight as to 
what may improperly influence candidates than is possessed by . . . many 
seasoned professionals who have been deeply involved in elective processes 
and who have viewed them at close range over many years.”326 
For these reasons, courts should give significant deference to the 
political branches’ considered judgments as to how competing constitutional 
commitments should be harmonized.  The judicial role should be to “ask[] 
whether the statute burdens any one such interest in a manner out of 
proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon the others . . .”327  Congress’ 
judgment should be judicially overridden only when there may be failures in 
the political process that undermine faith in the political branches’ 
decisions.328  The usual circumstances that lead to judicial suspicion of the 
political processes –  such as the presence of discrete and insular minorities329 
--  are absent from the instant context of campaign finance.  The one  
concern is whether the congressional judgment was a form of self-dealing 
that harmed unrepresented outsiders330 –people not currently in the 
legislature who might want to run for election in the future.  The most 
important question for determining the appropriate level of judicial deference  
is whether a campaign finance enactment had the intention, or effect, of 
protecting incumbents by making it more difficult for challengers.331  
                                                                                                                         
Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915, 967-70 (2006).   
325 Nixon, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis supplied). 
326 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 260-61 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
327 See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring); but see supra note 321 
(discussing the limitations of Breyer’s approach in Nixon). 
328 Id. at 402-03; cf. ELY, supra note 328, at 73-180 (arguing that the judiciary’s 
interference with ordinary majoritarian politics is appropriate where there are 
failures in the democratic process). 
329 See United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938).  
330 ELY, supra note 328, at 83-88. 
331 Cf. Randall v. Sorell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006), discussed supra Part III.C.2(a). 
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Challengers, after all, are generally less known to the public than incumbents, 
and challengers accordingly might be more harmed than incumbents by 
fundraising restrictions.332   
If Congress enacted BCRA for the purpose of protecting itself, such 
a judgment clearly would not be deserving of judicial deference.  A difficult 
question would be presented if, even absent any incumbent-protection intent 
on the part of Congress, campaign finance regulations had the effect of 
protecting incumbents.  Establishing that campaign finance has such an 
effect, however, ought to require serious empirical analysis, not just armchair 
theorizing.333  But even if campaign finance could be shown to have some 
incumbency-protecting effects, thereby diminishing or eliminating judicial 
deference to the legislature’s judgment, such effects should not ipso facto lead 
to a court’s conclusion that the legislation is unconstitutional.  Campaign 
finance regulations conceivably could have sufficiently important 
countervailing benefits vis-à-vis other aspects of Republican Legitimacy.   
Determining what if any connection there is between campaign 
finance and incumbency-protection lies beyond the scope of this Article.  
What is relevant is that the constitutional principle of Republican Legitimacy 
identifies a crucial issue that was almost entirely absent from the Court’s 
analysis in Citizens United:334  determining whether campaign finance 
regulations are a form of incumbent-protection is necessary to determining 
the judicial deference that should be given to the political branches’ 
considered harmonization of the competing constitutional commitments of 
free speech and Republican Legitimacy. 
V.     CONCLUSION (AND PROLOGUE) 
First, a brief conclusion.  Partisan gerrymandering and burdensome 
identification requirements that discourage certain populations from voting 
harm individuals, but they also threaten structural constitutional harms to  
representative democracy.  To date, case law has recognized only the former 
type of harm -- individual-rights based claims sounding in equal protection 
and free speech. This Article identified the structural constitutional interest 
                                                 
332 See Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumption and Undemocratic Consequences of 
Campaign Finance Reform, 105 Yale L. J. 1049, 1072-73 (1996) (arguing that 
“[c]ontribution limits tend to favor incumbents by making it harder for challenges to 
raise money and thereby made credible runs for office”). 
333 The strongest argument that campaign finance regulations protect incumbents 
was short on empirics.  See Smith, supra note 332, at 1072-75.   
334 In some of the cases prior to Citizens United, Justices Scalia and Kennedy had 
explicitly accused campaign finance of being an incumbency-protection ploy.  See, 
e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 
306 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part). The more liberal members of the Court have 
offered up arguments in opposition. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 968-970 
(Stevens, dissenting).  While the majority opinion in Citizens United did not explicitly 
invoke the incumbency-protection accusation, Justice Stevens’ dissent did.  See id. 
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that also is endangered --  Republican Legitimacy – and explains why it is 
important that Republican Legitimacy be recognized as a standalone, 
structural constitutional principle.  
Now to the prologue.335 While  courts have a vital role in 
implementing Republican Legitimacy -- courts should identify Republican 
Legitimacy as a constitutional principle, define it, and determine what role 
they and other governmental institutions properly play in securing 
Republican Legitimacy – they are incapable of fully enforcing it on their own.  
Inherently political considerations appropriately inform many of the rules-of-
the-road of representative democracy.  Legislatures have better access to the 
information that properly informs --  and are better institutionally constituted 
to making the hard tradeoffs among the competing legitimate commitments 
that invariably lie behind – most of representative democracy’s rules-of-the-
road. Further, courts are a poor institutional context for distinguishing 
between reasonable and unreasonable compromises among legitimate 
considerations, though  they can play an important back-up role in policing 
(and hopefully thereby deterring) egregious violations.      
This means that the political branches themselves must be primarily 
responsible for protecting Republican Legitimacy.  This can be done if 
legislatures choose representative democracy’s rules-of-the-road by means of 
“tempered” rather than run-of-the-mill “hard-ball” politics.  Tempered 
politics refers to a set of norms that aim to harness politicians’ compromise-
seeking and deal-making skills, while ensuring that the legislative outcomes 
constitute reasonable compromises that do not undermine Republican 
Legitimacy.   Tempered politics tempers the ordinary rough-and-tumble of 
politics in two respects:  decisions implicating Republican Legitimacy must 
be (1) bipartisan, rather than deeply partisan, and (2) commonwealth 
directed, rather than self-interested or  party-interested.  In short, tempered 
politics is the higher-order care we expect when politicians consider 
constitutional amendments. And this is sensible insofar as the rules-of-the-
road of representative democracy implicate constitutional matters.     
But how realistic is it to expect that legislators will self-regulate, and 
act in accordance with the norms of tempered politics?  They are the ones, 
after all, who have harmed Republican Legitimacy in the first place.   
Fortunately, there are two reasons why reliance on legislatures is not 
a “self-defeating proposal” that unrealistically asks the legislatures to 
overcome the very weaknesses that my proposal aims to remedy.336  First, 
there is no reason to presume that legislators won’t take seriously their oaths 
to uphold the Constitution once they understand that it contains the 
principle of Republican Legitimacy.  Second, most harms to Republican 
                                                 
335 A companion article addresses the issues that follow. See Rosen, supra note 
21. 
336 For the concept of self-defeating proposals, see Adrian Vermeule, Self-
Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV 631, 636-40 
(2006). 
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Legitimacy have been created by state legislatures – the institutions that are 
presumptively, and primarily, responsible under the Constitution for 
establishing the rules governing both state and federal elections.337  Congress 
faces different incentives that insulate Congress from many of the pressures 
to which state legislatures are subject. There are several legislative strategies 
Congress can use to encourage states to act consistently with tempered 
politics.  Their detailed elaboration, however, must await another day.  
 
                                                 
337 See U.S. CONST. ART. I, §4, cl. 1. 
